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South Africa’s economy is built on mining, and the practice has contributed to the 
creation of countless jobs and industries. However, the toll on the environment has 
been enormous, leaving the current government with a legacy of ownerless and 
abandoned mines which are damaging the environment, especially through the 
resulting acid mine drainage and karstification, and a mining industry which often fails 
to properly comply with environmental legislation. This dissertation examines the 
market-based instruments used in the context of mining, and critically analyses the 
efficacy and appropriateness of the tools used to compel mines to prevent and mitigate 
environmental harm and to rehabilitate the disturbed land once mining is complete. 
With a focus on the incentive-based instruments, and especially the financial provisions 
(or performance bonds) under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
the dissertation goes on to argue that these measures are not enough to combat the 
inherent problems caused by mining, in particular acid mine drainage. A number of 
market-based instruments used in other jurisdictions are examined, with a focus on 
performance bonds, environmental funds, environmental tax, tax incentives and 
mitigation banking, and their feasibility and possible utility in South Africa is critiqued. 
Amongst the suggestions for future developments, it is proposed that an 
environmental fund such as the superfund used in the United States of America (in 
relation to hazardous waste) be introduced, either as an alternative to, or in 
conjunction with, the current financial provisions. This would deal with the perpetual 
nature of many of the environmental problems and would lighten the financial burden 
on government, allowing rehabilitation and mitigation measures to be carried out in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
South Africa is a country blessed with both mineral wealth and an environment filled 
with undeveloped expanses of nature, rich biodiversity and unique ecosystems. The 
mineral wealth has formed the backbone of the country’s economy for over 100 years,
1
 
creating jobs and allowing for much needed development.
2
 However, the benefits from 
mining have come at a great cost to the environment,
3
 especially the country’s limited 
water resources, and the economic cost of this environmental degradation is now 




One of the biggest threats to the environment resulting from past and current mining 
activity is acid mine drainage (AMD), which occurs when sulphide-bearing material is 
exposed to oxygen and water, resulting in th  water becoming acidic.
5
 It is 
characterised by elevated concentrations of salts, heavy metals and radionuclides,
6
 and 
poses a threat to the environment (especially biodiversity), health and property.
7
 AMD 
is an international problem, but is becoming especially difficult in South Africa due to 
the large-scale closure of mining operations since the 1970s, the subsequent 
                                                           
1
 Swart E “The South African Legislative Framework For Mine Closure” 2003 Journal of South African 
Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 489-493. 
2
 Although the direct contribution of mining has decreased as the national economy has expanded, it still 
accounts for a large proportion of the GDP, contributing 7.7% in 2007, according to Sorensen P “Mining 
in South Africa: A Mature Industry?” 2011 68(5) International Journal of Environmental Studies 632. 
3
 Swart 2003 JSAIMM 489. 
4
 A legacy of over 6,000 ownerless and abandoned derelict mines has been passed on to the State, who 
accept responsibility for mines once a closure certificate is issued, and who are also responsible where 
no legally responsible person can be identified, or it is impractical or inequitable to require a mine or a 
responsible person to carry out the rehabilitation, according to Dixon C “Mine Closure from a Legal 
Perspective” 2003 103(8) Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 485. This has 
resulted in the state being responsible for rehabilitation costs of R1.456 billion. Cf Fourie M “R1.4 bn to 
rehabilitate abandoned mines” Business Day (2010.09.15). Acid mine drainage (AMD) is a related 
problem, but is perpetual in nature and is now threatening both the environment and economy, due to 
potential health and property damage. The long-term cost of dealing with this problem on the 
Witwatersrand has been estimated to be R1.08 billion without factoring the desalination of this polluted 
water. Cf Salgado I “Acid Water Clean-Up to Cost Blns” Business Report (2011.02.05). 
5
 Ackil A & Koldas S “Acid Mine Drainage (AMD): Causes, Treatment and Case Studies” 2006 Journal of 
Cleaner Production 1139. 
6
 Expert Team of the Inter-Ministerial Committee under the Coordination of the Council for Geosciences 
2010 Mine Water Management in the Witwatersrand Gold Fields with Special Emphasis on Acid Mine 
Drainage(“AMD Report”) 1. 
7












termination of the extraction of underground water from these mines, and the fact 
that many of them have been left unrehabilitated and are now the responsibility of the 
state.
8
 The problem was first highlighted in 2002, when water began to decant from an 
abandoned shaft in the Mogale City / Randfontein area as a result of flooding of the 
mines in the basin.
9
 Since then the problem has received much attention in the 
government,
10
 but because of the fact that many mines contribute to the problem, and 
the fact that the situation is perpetual in nature (since the water must be pumped and 
treated in order to avoid a decant into the environment at large) it is an on-going battle 
to fund and manage AMD. 
 
Although serious environmental problems exist currently, there has been a tangible 
shift in government’s approach towards environment governance and the regulation of 
mining, culminating in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA)
11
 and the Regulations promulgated under it.
12
 The focus has shifted from 
ensuring economic growth regardless of the environmental costs, as was the apartheid 
government’s approach when dealing with the mining industry with which it had a 
mutually beneficial relationship,13 to the current stance which embraces the 
                                                           
8
 Team of Experts 2010 AMD Report. 
9
 Winde & Stoch “Threats and Opportunities for Post-Closure Development in Dolomitic Gold Mining 
Areas of the West Rand and Far West Rand” 2010 36(1) WaterSA 70. 
10
 An inter-ministerial committee on acid mine drainage has been set up, and a Team of Experts, 
representing both the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Mineral Resources, published 
the AMD Report, which was approved by Cabinet on 9 February 2010. Various presentations have been 
made to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs regarding AMD, 
including presentations by National Treasury, and the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs 
appointed the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, by means of Ministerial Directive on the 6 April 2011, to 
implement the immediate and short term actions recommended in the AMD Report. According to the 
Department of Water Affairs 2011 Progress Report on the Management of Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) in 
the Witwatersrand Mining Region to the Portfolio Committee: Water and Environment, AMD is currently 
decanting at surface level in the Western basin, and Environmental Critical Level (ECL) above which there 
is a threat to the environment, will be reached in the Central Basin by August of 2012, and the Eastern 
Basin by December 2013. Although measures are being taken by the Tran-Caledon Tunnel Authority 
(TCTA), it is clear that the problem requires the co-operation of the private sector and urgent action by 
government. 
11
 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA). 
12
 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations GN R527 in Government Gazette 26275 of 
23 April 2004. 
13
 Van Eeden et al “Legal Issues Concerning Mine Closure and Social Responsibility on the West Rand” 
2009 5(1) TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 52; Adler R, Claassen M, 












environmental right under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution)
14
 and embraces the principle of sustainable development.  
 
However, this shift in approach takes place in the reality of serious environmental 
degradation caused by mining. The state’s liability for ownerless and abandoned mines 
stems from a historic lack of environmental regulation. Prior to the current mining 
regime of the MPRDA and its Regulations, mining and closure of mines were governed 
by the Minerals Act,15 and there was widespread use of irresponsible mining methods, 
with little regard to the protection of the environment, and companies often failed to 
rehabilitate mining areas before being liquidated or leaving the country.
16
 Mine 
closures before 1956 were not subject to legislative closure requirements, and are now 




Adding to this problem is the fact that many mining companies refuse to take 
responsibility for acid mine drainage and other environmental and health problems 
associated with mining,18 since it is something which is caused by multiple sources. A 
solution will have to involve both government and the mining sector.19 Co-operation 
between the mining sector and the government is necessary because the Department 
of Mineral Resources on its own does not have sufficient resources to rehabilitate the 
ownerless and abandoned mines around South Africa, which number around 6000 and 
would cost R1.5 billion to rehabilitate.
20
 Of these 6000 sites, many may not have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Management in South Africa” 2007 2(1) The Economics of Pease and Security Journal 33 at 34. The 
government profited enormously from mining in the past, with taxes of up to 57% being imposed on 
mining profits. The relationship with the mining industry was therefore profitable, leading to an 
abandonment of regulatory responsibility in the environmental context. 
14
 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
15
 Minerals Act 50 of 1991 
16
 Swart 2003 JSAIMM at 489; Limpitlaw et al “Post-mining Rehabilitation, Land Use and Pollution at 
Collieries in South Africa” 2005 Colloquium: Sustainable Development in the Life of Coal Mining 2. 
17
 Swart 2003 JSAIMM at 489. 
18
 Van Eeden et al 2009 TDRSA at 52. 
19
 The need for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has been recognised by the National Treasury, who 
suggested that such opportunities should be explored as a matter of urgency, as well as proposing the 
use of an environmental superfund to combat AMD. Cf National Treasury 2011 Acid Mine Drainage: 
Funding & Recommendations (Presentation to Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Water & 
Environmental Affairs) 11-12. 
20












traceable owners or people who can be held responsible for rehabilitation, since many 





The tools which are used to control the effects of mining on the environment have also 
evolved, with the introduction of market-based instruments (MBI) aimed at achieving a 
more efficient regulation and correction of the market failure which led to the 
exclusion of the cost to the environment from the price of the commodities which were 
mined.
22
 MBIs have been defined by the National Treasury as “a group of policy 
instruments that seek to correct environmentally-related market failures through the 
price mechanism”.
23
 They are becoming increasingly popular as an alternative set of 
tools in environmental management, both internationally and in South Africa.
24
 These 
tools are suggested as complimentary mechanisms, to be used alongside the existing 
command-and-control regulations, as a means of strengthening them and overcoming 
their shortcomings. Several potential complimentary MBIs are suggested by the 
dissertation to address the current problems in the mining sector. One means of 
overcoming the problems caused by ownerless and abandoned mines, and AMD, is a 
superfund model, based on the United States of America’s approach to hazardous 
waste. This would allow companies currently operating in the mining sector, or who 
have operated in the past and who own unrehabilitated mines, to contribute financially 
to the government’s rehabilitation efforts and the on-going costs of treating AMD.
25
 
                                                           
21
 Coetzee H “Mine Water Management in South Africa”2009 Freiberg Online Geology 27. 
22
 Adler et al 2007 EPSJ 35 argue that the production costs have historically been held artificially low by 
the mining companies through the deflection of certain costs, such as rehabilitation of the environment 
and social welfare, to the state and third parties. It could be argued that this practice continues, since 
environmental liability may be passed on to a third party, and may be lowered to make this prospect 
more lucrative to potential buyers. 
23
 National Treasury (Tax Policy Chief Directorate) 2006 A Framework for Considering Market-Based 
Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa – Draft Policy Paper  (“Draft Policy 
Paper”) 2. 
24
 Whitten SM, Van Bueren M & Collins D “An overview of market-based instruments and environmental 
policy in Australia” 2004 Market-based Tools for Environmental Management. Proceedings of 6
th
 Annual 
AARES Symposium RIRDC, Canberra, Australia at 1; Paterson A “Pruning the Money-Tree to Ensure 
Sustainable Growth: Facilitating Sustainable Development Through Market-Based Instruments” 2006 
9(3) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  89. 
25
 The Minister of Finance stated in an answer to a parliamentary question of whether it intended to 













Mines operating currently under the MPRDA, or who can be traced as owners of 
unrehabilitated mining areas, are held liable for the costs of rehabilitation.
26
 In order to 
ensure that companies have the financial means to rehabilitate mines after closure, 
and to guarantee that there will be sufficient funds in the event of an unexpected 
closure of the mine, a financial provision must be made by the person or company 
applying for a mining right, as part of their Environmental Management Programme or 
Plan (EMP).27 The quantum of this financial provision is governed by a set of guidelines 
published by the Department of Mineral Resources in 2005, and may be in the form of 
either a trust fund, a financial guarantee from a bank, a direct deposit or any other 
method determined by the Director-General. These options are set out under the 
Regulations
28
 promulgated under the Act, and the MPRDA includes insurance as a form 
of financial provision in the definitions in section 1. By far the most common form that 
these financial provisions take is that of trust fund, and this is perhaps to do with the 
fact that another MBI – a tax incentive – is used to encourage mining companies to 
comply with this law to the letter.29 
 
The financial provision contained in the MPRDA
30
 is a form of MBI known as a 
performance bond, which creates an incentive for mining companies to rehabilitate 
properly and to mitigat  environmental damage caused by the operation. The incentive 
exists because the Minister may use all or some of the financial provision to 
rehabilitate disturbed land and environmental degradation, should the mine fail to do 
                                                                                                                                                                           
mines would fall within the Department of Water Affairs’ new Waste Discharge Charge System (WDCS), 
while a different arrangement would have to be made to deal with AMD from abandoned mines. Cf 
Minister of Finance 2011 Reply to Question Number 3471 by Mrs HN Ndude (Cope) to ask the Minister of 
Finance in National Assembly for Written Reply NW4145E (11 November 2011). 
26
 As mentioned in the note above, the liability of operational mines for AMD will soon fall under the 
WDCS to be introduced under the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
27
 Section 41 of the MPRDA 2002. This section is entitled  ‘Financial provision for the remediation of 
environmental damage’ and is thoroughly examined below at 3.1. 
28
 Regulation 53 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations (MPRDR) GN R 527 in 
GG 26275 of 2004-04-23. 
29
 The tax incentive was introduced under section 37A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
30














 and it is therefore in the financial interest of the mine to maintain 
and rehabilitate the area themselves, in order to get the performance bond back.  
 
This form of MBI is also used in other jurisdictions, notably the United States of 
America, to ensure that land which is disturbed by mining is returned to its pre-mined 
state, including re-vegetation.
32
 However, there are a variety of weaknesses in both the 
approach on its own, and in its implementation. The financial provision may be 
vulnerable to insolvency (despite the mechanism being designed specifically to deal 
with unexpected closure),
33
 and the guidelines
34
 published by the Department
35
 have 
not been updated since 2005, leading to an insufficient quantum being put aside when 
rights holders fail to take inflation into account. 
 
The slew of unrehabilitated ownerless and abandoned mines, along with the cessation 
of pumping at mines which are have closed, is resulting in serious threats to the 
environment. The traditional command and control instruments which dominate the 
regulation of mining are therefore proving insufficient, and the market-based 
mechanisms which are being utilised are not filling the gaps sufficiently to form a 
complementary and complete framework for the governance of mining rehabilitation 
and environmental protection. 
 
This dissertation seeks to identify the MBIs which are currently used in South Africa to 
regulate the environmental impact of mining, and to critically evaluate their efficacy 
and appropriateness as tools to compel mines to prevent and mitigate environmental 
harm and to rehabilitate the disturbed land once mining is complete. The focus will lie 
with the main incentive-based tool of the performance bond currently used under the 
                                                           
31
 A portion of the performance bond may be withheld to deal with latent or residual environmental 
impacts, according to section 41 of the MPRDA. 
32
 Di Leva “The Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources through Legal and Market-Based 
Instruments” 2002 11(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 93. 
33
 The vulnerability of each form of financial provision is discussed below in 3.3.1. 
34
 Department of Minerals and Energy 2005 Guideline Document for the Evaluation of the Quantum of 
Closure-Related Financial Provision Provided by a Mine (“Guideline Document”). 
35
 This Guideline Document is contemplated in Regulation 54(1) to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 












MPRDA. This form of MBI is surveyed, and its effectiveness and interaction with other 
forms of MBIs (such as tax incentives) is discussed. A selection of alternative MBIs used 
in foreign jurisdictions are then examined to determine how the existing instruments in 
use in South Africa can be improved, and whether some or all of these new instruments 
could be introduced to remedy short-fallings which are resulting in non-compliance 
with the regime and leading to environmental degradation. The use of performance 
bonds and tax incentives in foreign jurisdictions is discussed and compared to their use 
in South Africa, and the introduction of environmental funds, environmental taxes and 
the habitat banks are contemplated. Finally the five options put forward for inclusion in 
the existing regulatory framework, or suggestions of how the existing MBIs may be 
improved, are assessed according to a set of criteria, and their feasibility is gauged. This 
dissertation will be limited to an examination of these instruments as they apply in the 
mining context currently, and to new MBIs which could be introduced into the 
regulatory context to complement the current system. 
 
In line with the National Treasury’s policy advocating the use of MBIs to complement 
direct regulatory efforts, the dissertation proceeds in Chapter 2 to examine the theory 
relating to these regulatory instruments. The chapter examines the forms of MBIs and 
why it has become nece sary to introduce these instruments into the existing 
regulatory framework. Several criteria which influence the choice and design of these 
instruments are introduced and these are used in the subsequent chapters to evaluate 
the use of current and potential MBI in South Africa’s regulatory regime governing 
mining. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the current regulatory regime governing mining 
and the environment in South Africa. It provides the necessary context for the 
subsequent evaluation of the current and potential application of MBIs in the domestic 
mining context. Although there are a number of laws which are of relevance,
36
 they are 
                                                           
36
 These include inter alia the National Environmental Management Waste Act 59 of 2008; National 
Environmental Management Air Quality Act 39 of 2004; National Environmental Management Protected 












simply too numerous to discuss in detail. I will therefore principally focus on South 
Africa’s primary mining legislation, namely the MPRDA, the Mineral and Petroleum 
Royalties Act,
37
 and the Minerals Act,
38
 which is still applicable to a certain extent. The 
framework legislation governing the environment, the National Environmental 
Management Act,
39
 is the most important statute in relation to the environment, and is 
discussed in relation to mining. Its relationship with the MPRDA is discussed, as are the 
attempted amendments to both Acts under the National Environmental Management 
Amendment Act.40 The National Water Act41 is also examined in relation to the 
regulation of mining. The chapter ends by examining the existing MBIs in operation in 
the current regulatory regime, and discussing their success or lack thereof, as well as 
any particular strengths or weaknesses. Several tax-based instruments exist in the 
context of environmental protection which may be of relevance to mining operations, 
including those which relate to property tax,
42





 However, the scope of this dissertation is limited, and 




                                                                                                                                                                           
Environmental Management Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008; National Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999; and Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
37
 Mineral and Petroleum Royalties Act 28 of 2008. 
38
 Minerals Act 51 of 1991. 
39
 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
40
 National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008. 
41
 National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
42
 Section 8 of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 allows for differential rates 
to be charged by municipalities in relation to protected areas, thereby incentivising owners to declare 
their land under the National Environmental Management Protected Areas Act (NEMPAA) 57 of 2003. 
Section 15 of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act further allows for municipalities to 
grant exemptions, reductions and rebates in terms of criteria set out in its rates policy, which includes 
protected areas. 
43
 Section 37B of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 allows for the deduction from a taxpayer’s income in 
relation to new and unused environmental treatment and recycling assets and waste disposal assets. 
This is especially relevant in the water treatment context of mining, since water contaminated by the 
mining process must be treated in order for mines to avoid falling foul of the National Water Act 36 of 
1998. 
44
 According to section 37C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, a tax deduction is allowed where 
biodiversity management agreements are entered into between the owner of the land and the 
government. Where a protected areas agreement is entered into between the owner of land under 
NEMPAA, section 37C of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 allows for the deduction from the taxable 
income of costs incurred by the owner due to conservation and maintenance of the land. 
45












Drawing from the practice undertaken in several foreign jurisdictions, Chapter 4 
outlines which forms of MBIs have historically proven useful in the mining context. 
These MBIs include performance bonds, environmental funds, environmental taxes, tax 
incentives and the use of a habitat bank. Each of these options, and their theoretical 
merits, disadvantages and prerequisites for success are discussed. 
 
The potential applicability and utility of the MBIs identified in Chapter 4 is critically 
evaluated in Chapter 5 according to the criteria laid out in Chapter 2 which influence 
their choice and design. The dissertation concludes by proposing which of these MBI’s 
is most suitable for introduction in the South African context and how certain of the 













Chapter 2: Theoretical context of market-based 
measures applicable to mining  
 
Market-based instruments (MBIs) are rapidly growing, both internationally and in 
South Africa. However, they are generally designed to fill the gaps left by command-
and-control measures, and to operate alongside these traditional regulatory tools, 
rather than to replace them. MBIs are also not always suitable, and the context and 
objectives which need to be achieved must be carefully examined in deciding whether 
and MBI is the right tool, and if so, how and when it will be introduced into the legal 
framework. The weaknesses of the traditional command-and-control tools are 
examined, and the corresponding strengths of MBIs are then discussed. Eight criteria 
have been identified by the National Treasury as key in deciding the suitability of MBIs, 
and these are used later on as evaluation tools in the context of the MBIs put forward 
for introduction or amendment in the South Africa legislative framework. 
 
2.1 How Market-Based Instruments Fit Into the Legal Landscape 
 
There is a growing realisation, both domestically and internationally, that the tools 
which have traditionally been used in environmental management are not achieving 
the goals of protecting the environment sufficiently. This has prompted a move away 
from the traditional ‘command-and-control’ approach, and a shift towards alternative 
mechanisms such as incentive-based tools and self-regulation.46 However, it is 
recognised that incentive-based tools such as market-based instruments “are certainly 
not a panacea for environmental problems,”
47
 and that in most cases they are most 
effectively utilised as a complimentary tool to command-and-control regulations.
48
 This 
is the case both in South Africa and foreign jurisdictions, and in the sphere of 
                                                           
46
 Kidd Environmental Law2009 209-210. 
47
 Dolšak N & Sampson K “The Diffusion of Market-Based Instruments: The Case of Air Pollution” 2011 
20(10) Administration & Society 3. 
48












environmental regulation around mining several different kinds of enforcement 
techniques under both the command-and-control and incentive-based categories of 
regulation are used. 
  
The command-and-control approach traditionally uses two processes – a command 
through regulations prescribing a range of legislative standards, prohibitions and 
restrictions, and control through an array of enforcement measures which are used in 
the event of non-compliance.49 Sanctions are applied for contravention of the 
regulations,
50
 either through criminal, administrative or civil measures.
51
 This system 
involves strict monitoring by the authorities as to whether the law is being followed,
52
 




The alternative compliance mechanisms have come into use more recently, and involve 





 are initiated by industry, which voluntarily 
prescribes objectives and mechanisms which should be used to achieve these; state 
involvement is generally absent.56 Although an important component in changing the 
behaviour of industry, self-regulatory tools will not be discussed further here. 
 
                                                           
49
 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie “Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement” in Paterson & 
Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 2009 51-52. 
50
 Paterson 2006 PELJ 88. 
51
 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie “Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement” in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement 52. 
52
 Kidd Environmental Law 210. 
53
 Paterson “An Incentive-Based Approach to Environmental Regulation” in Paterson & Kotze (eds) 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 2009 297. 
54
 Kidd Environmental Law 209; Craigie, Snijman & Fourie “Dissecting Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement” in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement  58. 
55
 Self-regulatory instruments include co-operative agreements, certification schemes and corporate 
environmental responsibility programmes. Some commentators also include information-based 
instruments, such as labelling schemes, under this heading, while others list these as separate tools. 
Closely related to the self-regulatory mechanisms are the co-regulatory instruments, under which the 
state prescribes objectives and standards, but the objectives used to achieve these are left to industry to 
decide. Cf Kidd “Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law” South 
African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 28-31; Paterson “An Incentive-Based Approach to 
Environmental Regulation” in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 298-300. 
56
 Paterson “An Incentive-Based Approach to Environmental Regulation” in Environmental Compliance 












Incentive-based tools sit in between the command-and-control mechanisms and the 
self-regulatory tools, and use reward as an incentive to comply with state objectives 
and standards.
57





 incentives, the main body of instruments can be classified as market-based 




Market-based incentives (MBIs) attempt to influence economic behaviour in order to 
achieve certain desirable goals.61 The theory behind these tools is based on the 
economic theory around markets. This theory provides that markets are usually the 
most efficient, if not the most equitable, means of allocating scarce resources, since 
through the price mechanism they provide a strong incentive to all users to optimise 
the use of resources, leading to efficiency.
62
 However, in practice, the market fails to 
adequately value various goods and services, resulting in these cost of the goods and 
services not being reflected in their price, and subsequent inefficient use and 
externalities.
63
 Where such market failure occurs, a strong rationale exists for state 
intervention, in order to influence behaviour towards a more fair and efficient use of 
the under-valued goods and services.64  
 




 Regulatory incentives are those instruments which encourage individuals, industry and organisations 
to exceed the standards by offering to reduce the regulatory burden on those who demonstrate high 
levels of environmental performance and investment in environmental management. See Paterson “An 
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A classic example of this market failure is in the context of the environment. Since 
there is open access to the environmental goods and services and most markets fail to 
accurately value environmental goods and services, and the environmental costs and 
benefits are not reflected in the prices.
65
 This leads to greater than optimal levels of 
use and consumption,
66
 undermining conservation efforts and in some cases using up 
non-renewable resources to the detriment of future generations. MBIs in the South 
African environmental governance context are therefore “a group of policy instruments 





Various forms of market-based instruments exist, and different commentators divide 
them according to various criteria. Some divide the tools into those using positive and 
negative incentives,
68





 has combined these typologies into an overarching categorisation 
which incorporates almost all forms of market-based instruments, a more simple 
classification system will be used in this dissertation, dividing market-based 
instruments into tax instruments and non-tax instruments. This is due to the National 
Treasury’s preference of tax instruments as the market-based instrument of choice,
71
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MBIs in the form of tax instruments include environmental taxes imposed on 
environmental “bads” such as pollution emissions, and tax incentives or benefits, which 
include incentives in the form of eligibility for expenses deductions such as accelerated 
depreciation write-offs or other inducements used to stimulate particular forms of 
investment.  
 
Non-tax based instruments include a range of tools with differing purposes and forms, 
lumped together in this dissertation purely because they are not tax based. This 
category includes performance bonds, environmental funds, offset agreements, 
deposit-refund systems and direct subsidies. 
 
2.2 The Shift Towards Market-Based Instruments 
 
The shift towards an incentive-based approach can be seen in many jurisdictions,73 
including South Africa. This is especially so in the environmental context, with National 
Treasury issuing several policy papers which explicitly outline its intention to use and 
develop MBIs for this means.
74
 The need for such a shift stems from several short-
comings in the command-and-control approach, as well as certain characteristics of 
incentive-based instruments, especially MBIs, which work well in the environmental 
context. However, it should be noted that despite the rise in prominence of MBIs, their 
effectiveness depends on the continued existence and enforcement of the traditional 
command-and-control tools, which they are designed to complement rather than 
replace. 
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The traditional command-and-control instruments have several weaknesses. In the 
context of environmental protection, the first and most debilitating drawback is that 
they are predominantly reactive, and thus unable to prevent environmental 
degradation.
75
 Secondly, the highly centralised regulations are often time-consuming 
and expensive to monitor and enforce, requiring well-resourced and capacitated 
enforcement authorities.
76
 Third, this over-bureaucratic system is inflexible, failing to 
allow authorities to tailor the means of achieving goals to the varying sectoral, 
individual and geographic situations.77 Fourthly, since command-and-control 
regulations often use technology- and performance-based standards, there is little or 
no incentive for firms to exceed their control targets, leading to little or no 
development or adoption of new and more effective technologies.
78
 Fifthly, and 
importantly in the mining context, there is a traditional focus on supply-side controls, 
while demand management is ignored.
79
 In the context of finite and rapidly dwindling 
supplies of natural resources, supply-side management is vital, and it is here that MBIs 
play an important role, through using the price mechanism to internalise the external 
cost to the environment, and potentially the loss suffered by future generations who 
will not have access to finite resources used up by the current generation. Finally, the 
command-and-control approach fails to remedy the market’s failure to account for the 
use of environmental good  and services.
80
 These environmental goods and services, 
which include soil, wat r, air, flora and fauna, and ecosystems as a whole, are common 
goods, and the market’s failure to build in the cost of their use and pollution into the 
market price of products is resulting in the tragedy of the commons.
81
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In recognising the risk facing the environment, and the failure of the traditional 
command-and-control approach to remedy it, states are turning to incentive-based 
tools, especially MBIs, to fill the gaps. This new approach to environmental 
management “use[es] market principles to achieve environmental goals while avoiding 




The most resounding endorsement of these new kinds of regulatory tools is that they 
are more efficient than command-and-control measures.
83
 They seem to have 
characteristics which counter many of the weaknesses found in the traditional 
command-and-control tools, starting with the fact that they are pre-emptive rather 
than reactive, and are therefore inherently better suited to combatting and preventing 
environmental degradation. Secondly, incentive-based measures are more cost 
effective, both to the regulated industry and the state.
84
 They provide for a cost-
effective allocation of the pollution control burden among sources without requiring 
the state to have this information.85 They also relieve the regulatory burden on the 
state, since its role is reduce to a monitor, rather than an admissions body hosting 
individual emissions levels,
86
 and thereby avoiding the problems caused by capacity 
and resource constraints.
87
 In fact, certain MBIs may be used to raise revenue for the 
state, and therefore make money rather than cost it. Therefore this type of approach 
may constitute a policy innovation which is win-win for the economy and the 
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environment – it leads to a reduction of regulatory cost without increasing the risk of 




Thirdly, in contrast to the rigid controls put in place under the traditional approach, 
MBIs encourage flexibility in control technology, allowing individual firms to devise 
control methods which are most appropriate, effective and cost-saving.
89
 This in turn 
leads to the fourth advantage – the incentive for firms to devise new products or 
production technologies which are ‘greener’, more efficient, and overall will save them 
money.
90
 Another aspect of this advantage is that there is an economic self-interest to 
go above and beyond the required level, and this may result in more efficient resource 
use and improved environmental outcomes.
91
 Fifthly, by using the price mechanism to 
build externalities into the amount consumers pay, the impact shifts towards demand-
management rather than only focusing on the supply side. This is increasingly 
important in the context of rapidly dwindling natural resources, especially non-
renewable ones such as those in the mining context. 
 
Finally, the incentive based tools attempt to cure the market failure.92 The knock-on 
effect of this internalisation of the environmental cost into the price of commodities is 
manifold. Furthermore, with those MBIs which raise revenue, the double dividends 
theory would apply, decreasing the negative effects on low-income households.
93
 This 
theory, used in the context of environmental taxes, posits that the tax would diminish 
pollution at no cost, or even lead to additional benefits, if the revenue was used to 
reduce distortionary taxes such as tax on labour. This second dividend would then 
theoretically manifest either as an increase in welfare or GDP, or a decrease in 
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 However, the setting of the tax rate, or of any other rate at which an 
MBI builds an externality into a price, must be random, and therefore may not 
accurately cure the market failure.
95
 This is because where the true externalised cost is 
accurately reflected in the tax or other MBI, this may adversely impact on economic 
behaviour so drastically that it creates hostility and negatively impacts on the 
economy.
96
 Therefore, although incentive based tools may go a long way to curing 
market failure, the full environmental cost may still go unpaid by users. 
 
2.3 Choosing the Right Market-Based Instrument 
 
In choosing the right instrument to fit the context several of criteria have been 
identified by both academics and the South African government as key in deciding 
which MBIs should be selected. In the policy document A Framework for Considering 
Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa
97
, 
the National Treasury outlined the criteria it would use to assess the suitability of the 
environmentally-related taxes proposed in the document. These echo the sentiments 
expressed by commentators, and set out eight broad criteria to be used in addition to 
the general principle by government in future to determine the appropriateness of 
environmentally-related tax instruments. Although these guidelines are very broadly 
framed, they will be used as a springboard from which to assess the suitability of MBIs 
suggested for introduction into the South African mining regulatory context, and will be 
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 are environmental effectiveness,
100





 policy, legal and institutional alignment,
103
 and public support.
104
 





 and economic competitiveness 
impacts.
107
 Where tax instruments are used, they should be tested against the 
generally accepted canons of taxation principles, such as neutrality, equity, certainty, 
simplicity and cost minimisation.108109 
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In choosing incentive-based tools to introduce into the existing regulatory system, the 
context must be carefully considered, since some environmental problems are not 
better managed through incentives. Some problems are so complex that no package of 
incentives can be suggested that might achieve efficient control of the problem,
110
 
while others are inherently better dealt with through traditional regulation, such as 
localised “threshold” effects which cause serious damage on where pollution exceeds a 
given concentration in a particular location.111 This is because, by their nature, MBIs 
lead to reduced regulatory control over individual polluters, as well as the spatial 
distribution of pollution;
112
 they are designed to induce an aggregate reduction in 
pollution or risk without ensuring particular level of control at any given facility or 
location,
113
 since how the pollution is allocated up to the objective standard is 
determined by the market rather than regulation. Selecting the appropriate form of 
intervention is therefore a difficult task, and combinations of different MBIs, or hybrid 
systems of command-and-control regulations combined with incentive-based tools, 
may be required.114 Therefore, before implementation, incentive-based tools would 
need to be subjected to a formal method of instrument choice, and debated within the 
context of government policy and the realistic context of the environmental problem 
which needs to be solved.
115  
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Chapter 3: Regulatory context – legislation governing 
mining rehabilitation and environmental protection in 
South Africa 
 
Although mining is one of the main elements in South Africa’s economy, and poses 
serious and inevitable risks to the environment, it is not overly regulated in the context 
of environmental protection. Currently little incentive exists further than public 
relations for mines in South Africa to go beyond loosely defined regulatory levels of 
rehabilitation. Despite the right to environmental protection being enshrined in the 
Constitution,116 and the fact that this country has some of the most advanced 
environmental protection laws, mining falls outside of many of the statutes enacted to 
prevent environmental degradation.
117
 The consequ nces are now threatening not only 
the environment, but the health and well-being of people in and around mines and the 
economy that the industry once championed. Despite certain set-backs to achieving 
more streamlined environmental management in the mining context, several MBIs are 
currently in place under a number of different statutes, and the environment has 
become a priority in more recent legislation governing this industry. Although there are 
a number of relevant laws relating to MBIs in the environmental context,118 those 
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3.1 South African Mining Legislation 
 
Mining in South Africa is regulated by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA),
120
 which came into force in 2002. This Act repealed among 
others the Minerals Act,121 which itself had consolidated virtually all previous mining 
legislation in force.122 The MPRDA is also the most important piece of legislation 
regulating the effect mining has on the environment, since it currently regulates all the 
authorisations required for mining, including environmental authorisations, and 
contains provisions relating to the protection of the environment during the mining 
process and the rehabilitation of the areas affected by such operations once they have 
ceased.  
 
The MPRDA contains numerous environmental provisions, and is more stringent that 
the preceding Minerals Act. This is true not only of the processes it lays out which 
govern the application for, granting of, and compliance monitoring, of mining 
authorisations in relation to environmental protection, but also the on-going and post-
closure rehabilitation of mines. Under the Minerals Act, in April 1991, the mining 
industry was first introduced to the concept of an environmental management 
programme (EMP) for prospecting and mining operations.
123
 However, although the 
legislation required mines to submit an EMP
124
 indicating the manner in which it 
intended to rehabilitate the disturbed surfaces, and addressing the environmental 
impacts of the mining during all its phases (therefore including a mine closure plan), 
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the details of the contents of the EMP was not spelled out in the statute.
125
 The details 
of what these documents should contain were addressed in a guideline document on 
EMPs created by the Department of Minerals and Energy (now the Department of 




A forerunner of the environmental liability clause contained in the MPRDA was section 
12 of the Minerals Act, which provided for on-going liability until the issue of a closure 
certificate by the Director: Mineral Development. Before such certificate could be 
issued, the Director had to be satisfied that all of the provisions of the Minerals Act had 
been complied with, and had to consult with the Chief Inspector of Mines to confirm 
that the provisions of the Mine Health and Safety Act
127
 had been fulfilled. A closure 
certificate could only be issued once the mine had been rehabilitated in accordance 
with the EMP, under section 38. However, since the exact contents of such an EMP 
were not mandated, and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) were discretionary, 
‘rehabilitation’ had no fixed meaning,
128
 and did not necessarily meet the standards 
required to return the land to a functional ecosystem, or even make it capable of future 
land use. 
 
The lack of statutorily prescribed standards was remedied with the introduction of the 
MPRDA in 2002, and later its Regulations.
129
 This new Act is more stringent than the 
Minerals Act, and the preamble affirms the State’s obligations to protect the 
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environment for the benefit of present and future generations.
130
 In line with this new 
emphasis on environmental protection, a key feature of the MPRDA is the formal 
construction of guidelines relating to environmental management programmes and 




The legislated procedure around mining and mine closure is complex, and involves 
various steps by both the applicant and the state. Before a right to prospect or mine is 
granted, the applicant must submit an environmental management plan or 
environmental management programme (EMP) respectively.
132
 The information and 
studies which must be contained in these EMP
133
 are prescribed, and an EIA is required 
for all mining rights.
134
 The contents of the EMP, the scoping report and the EIA report 
are specified in the MPRDA Regulations,
135
 and these reports, if effectively 





An important element of the EMP is the financial provision, contained in section 41 of 
the Act, supplemented by Regulations 53 and 54. This tool is a market-based 
instrument (MBI) which is built into the statute and provides a guarantee to protect the 
state against the risk of inheriting the responsibility to rehabilitate mines.
137
 Both the 
EMP and the quantum of the financial provision must be reviewed annually, and any 




The responsibility of those involved in reconnaissance, prospecting and mining to 
prevent environmental degradation and to remedy any environmental damage they 
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may cause is also increased under the MPRDA,
139
 and directors are jointly and severally 
liable for any unacceptable negative impact on the environment, including damage, 
degradation or pollution advertently or inadvertently caused by the company.
140
 
Although three main statutes governing environmental responsibility for damage 
caused by mining – the MPRDA, NEMA and the National Water Act – do not allow 
liability to be contracted out, the MPRDA does allow environmental liability to be 
transferred to a suitably qualified third party.141 While it a potential weakness that 
liability can be transferred away from the party who caused the environmental 




The MPRDA obligates the holder of a permit or right to give effect to the general 
objectives of the environmental management principles contained in Chapter 5 of 
NEMA, to consider, investigate, assess and communicate the impact of their 
prospecting or mining activities as contemplated in section 24(7) of the NEMA, and to 
manage all environmental impacts in line with their EMP and as an integral part of their 
operations.143 As far as is reasonably practicable, such person must also rehabilitate the 
environment affected by their mining or prospecting activities to its natural or 
predetermined state, or to a land use which conforms to the generally accepted 
principles of sustainable development.
144
 Liability for any damage, pollution or 
ecological degradation which occurs as a result of their actions attaches to the permit 
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or right holder, within and outside of the area to which the permit or right relates,
145
 
and director liability is created to pierce the corporate veil notwithstanding the statutes 
to the contrary.
146





Furthermore, where any reconnaissance, prospecting, mining or production operations 
cause ecological degradation, pollution or environmental damage which may be 
harmful to the health or well-being of anyone, and which requires urgent remedial 
measures, the Minister may direct the holder to investigate, evaluate, assess and 
report on the impact of the situation, to take such measures as directed, and to 
complete such measures in a specified period of time.
148
 If the holder fails to comply 
with such a directive, the Minister may act
149
 after affording the holder to make 
representations,
150
 and may apply ex parte to a High Court for an order to seize and sell 
the holder’s property to the extent necessary to cover the expenses of implementing 
the measures deemed necessary.
151
 In addition to this court application, the Minister 
may use funds appropriated for the purpose by Parliament in order to fully implement 
these measures.152 The amount equal to the funds necessary to fully implement the 




Both the MPRDA and NEMA compel mining companies to rehabilitate land on which 
mining activities have ceased. All elements surrounding the closure of mines are 
governed by section 43, which dramatically increases the level of required 
environmental rehabilitation and requires the participation of stakeholders, including 
other governmental departments. As under the Minerals Act, a closure certificate will 
only be issued once rehabilitation has been carried out in compliance with the 
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approved EMP, releasing the right holder from financial and legal responsibility for the 
minded-out land.
154
 The application for the closure certificate must be made to the 
Regional Manager, and must be accompanied by an environmental management risk 
report.
155
 Once written confirmation is received from the Chief Inspector and the 
Department of Water Affairs regarding the provisions pertaining to health and safety 
and the management of potential pollution to water resources, the Minister may issue 
the closure certificate.156 The Minister must then return what they deem to be an 
appropriate portion of the financial provision provided by the applicant, retaining any 
portion which they think necessary to cover latent or residual environmental impacts 
which may become known in the future.
157
 The level of rehabilitation required is much 
more objective under the MPRDA, and the fact that a portion of the financial provision 
may be retained and closure certificate not granted if the level of rehabilitation is not 
satisfactory provides a financial incentive to mining companies to rehabilitate to a high 
standard and to do so continuously throughout the mine’s life span.  
 
Another piece of legislation which must briefly be mentioned in the context of mining is 
the Mineral and Petroleum Royalties Act,158 which has been in operation since the 1 
May 2010. This Act imposes a royalty on any mineral resource recovered from within 
the Republic of South Africa, to be paid into the National Revenue Fund.
159
 The 
intention of the Act is to compensate the State, as custodianship over the country’s 
non-renewable mineral resources, when these are exploited by mining companies for 
their own private benefit.
160
 Although mining royalties have caused controversy 
worldwide, including in South Africa, this kind of tax is one way of compensating future 
generations for the loss of a non-renewable resource used up by the present 
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 According to the MPRDA, the mineral and petroleum resources in which 
our country is rich are the heritage of the people of South Africa,
162
 and it is therefore 
fitting that the state, as custodian, should levy a fee or consideration payable in respect 
of these resources.
163
 Although the regime has now come into effect, its potential 
effects on the mining industry and economy have been viewed sceptically by 
stakeholders, and the potential effects are evidenced by the fact that its 
implementation was delayed for ten months in order to assist the mining industry in 
surviving the global economic crisis and prevent job losses in 2009.164 
 
Although this legislation does not currently have any environmental slant, it is 
suggested that some or all of the revenue generated by this tax could be used in an 
environmental context. This idea is discussed in Chapter 5, especially in relation to a 
potential source of revenue for a statutory fund set up to provide money to rehabilitate 
ownerless and abandoned mines and to assist in the perpetual pumping and treatment 
of water polluted by old and current mines. 
 
3.2 South African Environmental Legislation of Key Relevance to Mining 
 
Although the state has historically turned a blind eye to much of the environmental 
damage caused by the mining industry in order to ensure economic growth, this stance 
is no longer viable, either politically or environmentally, and policy and legislation have 
changed dramatically over the past two decades. The introduction of the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA)165 in 1998 carried out the state’s 
Constitutional mandate to take reasonable legislative and other measures to prevent 
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pollution and ecological degradation and to secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources.
166
 This framework statute governs 
environmental management broadly, and the solid foundation of environmental 
protection which it creates has been built on by a number of sectoral environmental 
laws. Those most relevant to mining are discussed here, namely those concerning 




3.2.1 Mining Regulation and the National Environmental Management Act 
 
Environmental management in relation to specific mining activities is governed by the 
MPRDA, despite the legislature’s attempt in 2008
168
 to bring mining within the purview 
of the framework legislation governing the environment.
169
 The legislature attempted 
to create a fully integrated model under which the Minister of Environmental Affairs 
would be the only competent authority in regards to environmental authorisations 
relating to prospecting, mining, exploration, production and related activities.
170
 The 
amended statutes would have amalgamated the separate processes governing 
environmental authorisations, under NEMA and the MPRDA.171 However, this process 
has been halted by a failure of the Minister of Mineral Resources to activate a key 
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 which would have transferred all of the environmental management 
provisions from the MPRDA to NEMA,
173
 and the likelihood of this happening now 
seems slim.  
 
The opportunity to bring the environmental authorisations in the mining context under 
NEMA would also have allowed a more uniform and stringent EIA regime to be applied 
in mining,174 and would also have brought the compliance and enforcement provisions 
under NEMA into play.175 Further, the strengthening of the sanctions relating to the 
EMP under the MPRDA, contained in the National Environmental Management 
Amendment Act (NEMAA),
176
 has not been implemented.
177
 Two statutory offences are 
created by the MPRDA; the first is the failure to manage all environmental impacts in 
accordance with the approved EMP,
178
 and the second is the submission of inaccurate, 
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incorrect or misleading information connected with any matter.
179
 The sanction 
attached to the first is R500 000 or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both,
180
 while 
the sanction attaching to the second is a fine or imprisonment of up to six months, or 
both such fine and imprisonment.
181
 If the amendments had come into force, these 
sanctions would have increased dramatically to a fine not exceeding R5 million, or a 
sentence of up to ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment.
182
 Should the changes 
introduced by the Legislature not be implemented, an opportunity will be lost to 
streamline and strengthen environmental regulation in the mining sector, and to 
increase the industry’s compliance with environmental protection laws. 
 
However, as shown above, the MPRDA created a sea-change in the South African 
mineral law, bringing in a clear environmental agenda into the legislation.
183
 This new 
focus on environmental protection can be seen in the manner in which the mining 
statute ties in with the framework legislation governing the environment. The national 
environmental management principles in NEMA
184
 apply to all prospecting and mining 
operations, and serve as guidelines for the interpretation, administration and 
implementation of all of the environmental requirements of the MPRDA.185 One of 
these principles is that of sustainable development, which forms an integral part of the 
MPRDA,
186
 addressing both the socio-economic
187
 and environmental influence of 
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 Although mining cannot be sustainable in the true sense, since mineral 
deposits are finite, the environmental degradation can be mitigated, and land 
rehabilitated to a certain degree in order to ensure the possibility of future land use 
and re-establishment of ecosystems which previously existed.  
 
Although mining itself is not strictly governed by NEMA, the general duty of care 
contained in this Act does apply, and environmental authorisations are still required for 
listed activities which arise around the mining operations.189 The general duty of care 
contained in section 28 of NEMA applies to every person who causes, has caused or 
may cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment, and obligates such 
person to take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from 
occurring, continuing or recurring, or in so far as such harm to the environment is 
authorised by law or cannot be reasonably be avoided, that it be minimised and 
rectified.
190
 Therefore, even where mining is authorised by law and environmental 
harm is allowed for in an EMP and mining authorisation, environmental harm and 
pollution must be minimised and rectified independently of the MPRDA. A duty also 
exists to inform and educate employees about the environmental risks of any activity 
undertaken and manner in which they must perform their tasks in order to avoid 
causing significant pollution or degradation.
191
 Importantly in the context of water 
pollution in mining, section 28(3)(d) states that measures required in terms of the duty 
of care may include measures to contain or prevent the movement of pollutants or the 
causant of degradation.
192
 This provides another basis on which mining companies are 
obligated to act in the interests of preventing future pollution, regardless of the terms 
of their EMP and of when their mining right was granted (since the NEMA is patently 
retrospective193). Furthermore, any unlawful and intentional or negligent act or 
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omission which causes or is likely to cause significant pollution or environmental 
degradation is an offence, as is refusal to comply with a directive issued under section 
28.
194
 An act or omission which is unlawful and intentional or negligent, and which 





Section 30 of NEMA is also relevant to mining, and imposes a duty on responsible 
parties in relation to emergency incidents. It authorises the municipality involved, the 
provincial heads of department or other designated officials, or the Director-General to 
act when the necessary steps are not taken by other parties.
196
 The duty created by this 
section relates both to the actions which must be taken when emergency incidents 
occur,
197
 and reporting obligations,
198
 and further emphasises the responsibility of the 
person who caused damage to the environment to remedy the effects.
199
 The relevant 
authority may direct the responsible person to act to fulfil their responsibilities,
200
 and 
where it is unclear who the responsible person is, or where immediate action is 
required, the state may take the necessary steps to contain and minimise the effects of 
the incident, undertake clean-up procedures and remedy the effects of the incident.201  
 
Section 30 of NEMA applie  over-and-above the duties of parties under the MPRDA, 
and non-compliance is an offence.
202
 This provision allows for a much broader scope 
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for intervention, and is necessary in an industry which poses such a grave risk to the 
environment and to human health and safety (both of workers and those in and around 
areas which are mined). 
 
 
3.2.2 Mining Regulation and the National Water Act 
 
The National Water Act (NWA),203 which pre-dates the NEMA but which ties in closely 
with the framework Act, and which has been included as a specific environmental 
management Act (SEMA) under NEMA, deals with water pollution in section 19. The 
prevention and remedying of the effects of pollution in this provision are far-reaching 
in the mining context, and have been interpreted broadly by the courts.
204
 It obligates 
the owner, person in control of, occupier or user of land on which an activity took place 
or a situation exists which causes, has caused or is likely to cause pollution of a water 
resource, to take all reasonable measures to prevent any such pollution from occurring, 
continuing or recurring.205 Failure to act in situations where a catchment management 
agency (or the Minister of Water Affairs, where such agency has not yet been created) 
directs the person responsible for preventing or remedying the situation, results in the 
agency being allowed to act and to recover the costs incurred. Furthermore, section 
151 of the Act criminalises any intentional or negligent act or omission which pollutes 
or is likely to pollute a water resource,
206
 as well as the failure to comply with directives 
issued under section 19,
207
 resulting in a fine or jail sentence upon conviction. Coupled 
with the director liability contained in NEMA, this means that the directors of mining 
companies are personally liable for any pollution of water resources caused by mines, 
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including the widespread problems of acid mine drainage currently threatening large 
parts of the country. 
 
As in NEMA, the NWA also contains provisions relating to emergency incidents which 
govern the duties of the responsible person to report and act in emergency 
situations.
208
 These provisions are especially relevant in the mining context, considering 
the drastic effects that mining has on water, and the threat of water pollution caused 
by AMD which can decant and damage both the environment and property. The duties 
outlined in section 20 are very similar to those contained in NEMA, and consist of 
duties to act to report emergency incidents,
209
 to take all reasonable steps to contain 
and minimise, clean up and remedy the effects of the incident,
210
 and to comply with 
any directives issued by the catchment management agency.
211
 Non-compliance with 
this section is also a criminal offence in terms of section 151. 
 
The NWA is one of the only statutes other than the MPRDA to utilise financial 
provisions, and these are set out in Chapter 5 of the Act.212 The responsible authority is 
the Department of Water Affairs, and this area falls within their mandate to manage 
the country’s water resources. Therefore, although such mechanisms are relevant in 
the mining industry (and should be utilised more widely), a full discussion falls outside 
of the ambit of this diss rtation. The underlying concepts are however outlined. 
 
The Act sets out measures to finance the provision of water resource management 
services, as well as financial and economic measures to support the implementation of 
strategies aimed at water resource protection, conservation of water and the beneficial 
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use of water. Water use charges form part of a pricing strategy which may differentiate 
geographically, and is a form of demand management, as well as a means to raise 
revenue to fund water resource management.
213
 The Act also makes provision for a 
performance bond to be required as security, in order to protect the water resource, 
before a use licence is issued.
214
 However, although this mechanism exists in the Act, it 
seems not to be utilised by the authorities.  
 
3.3 Current Use of Market-Based Instruments in Relation to Mining 
 
The South African government’s move towards incorporating incentive-based tools into 
their regulatory regime is already present in the mining context in the form of both tax-
based and non-tax based MBIs. Financial guarantees
215
 are required to be set aside by 
mining companies before a mining or prospecting right is granted, and these 
performance bonds serve as guarantees against the risk of environmental rehabilitation 
being passed on to the state. Tax incentives exist under several statutes in relation to 
mining, incentivising mining companies to carry out their duties in relation to the 
financial provisions.
216
 The non-tax incentives will be dealt with first. 
 
3.3.1 Non-tax based incentives 
 
Perhaps the most important MBI introduced by the government is the financial 
provision currently in place under the MPRDA.
217
 According to this provision, an 
applicant for a mining or prospecting right is required to make the prescribed financial 
provision for the management or rehabilitation of negative environmental impacts 
before their EMP is approved.
218
 The forms of this financial provision are given to mean 
insurance cover, bank guarantee, trust fund or cash, and the quantum of such 
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performance guarantees must be sufficient to undertake the agreed work programmes, 
as well as to rehabilitate the relevant mining area.
219
 An official Guideline Document
220
 
was published by the Department of Mineral Resources in January 2005, in terms of 
Regulation 54(1), to assist mines in determining this quantum, and the Regulations 




The quantum put forward by the applicant must be to the satisfaction of the Minister, 
who may appoint an independent assessor to conduct an assessment and determine 
the financial provision.
222
 According to Regulation 54, the quantum must include a 
detailed itemisation of all costs required for the premature closing,
223
 the 
decommissioning and final closure of the operation and the post-closure management 
of residual and latent environmental impacts. This quantum must be annually 
reassessed by the holder of a prospecting or mining right or permit, and must be kept 
in line with their environmental liability.
224
 Should the holder of a prospecting or 
mining right or permit fail to rehabilitate or manage, or be unable to rehabilitate or 
manage any negative impacts on the environment, the Minister may, upon written 
notice, use all or part of the financial provision to rehabilitate or manage the negative 
environmental impact in question.
225
 The holder’s obligations to maintain and retain 
the financial provision remains in force until the closure certificate is issued in terms of 
section 43, and even then the Minister may retain a portion (or all) of the financial 
provision which they deem necessary to rehabilitate the closed mining or prospecting 
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operation in respect of latent or residual environmental impacts.
226
 A major short 
falling of the quantum provisions is that they do not specify that the Guideline 
Document should be reviewed and updated, and the first document released by the 
Department has also been the last. Therefore the quantum calculations remain at 2005 
levels, without provision being made for inflation, and although some of the major 
mines have built inflation into their calculations, many others have not, leaving the 
possibility open that the state could have to bear the financial responsibility of 
rehabilitating abandoned mines where operations are closed and the companies are 
unable to raise enough capital to carry out the rehabilitation themselves. 
 
The forms in which the financial provision may be made is also an area of slight 
confusion, since the vehicle of insurance is included in the definition of ‘financial 
provision’ in section 1 of the MPRDA, but does not appear in the list of methods 
contained in Regulation 53, which is repeated in the Guideline Document. A further 
oversight is the fact that the method of trust fund contribution must be in terms of an 
approve contribution as provided for in terms of section 10(1)(cH) of the Income Tax 
Act.227 However, this section has been repealed,228 leaving the precise meaning of this 
provision in question. 
 
Despite this oversight by the authorities, the trust fund is the preferred method of 
financial provision, especially by the larger mining operations.
229
 Because the annual 
contributions to a trust fund are tailored for funding the final mine closure over the life 
of a mine, according to a formula set out in the Guideline Document, a shortfall has 
developed in the overall liability in case of premature closure, and this shortfall was in 
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most cases not covered by any of the other methods.
230
 Although this fact is 
acknowledged in the Guideline Document, the process of the financial provision being 
“phased in” in portions by the mining companies has developed, with separate 
payments being made at set periods in the mine’s life rather than a lump sum being 
provided up front. However, upon close inspection of the wording contained in the 
MPRDA, this practice is not condoned by the MPRDA, and should not be allowed to 
continue by the authorities.231 It also seems that the Guideline Document envisages the 
full amount required to rehabilitate the mine in the event of premature closure to be 
available at all times, since it describes the annual assessment of the total quantum of 
environmental liability to be ensure that the financial provision is sufficient to cover the 
current liability (in the event of premature closure) as well as the end-of-mine 
liability.
232
 This is referred to as a “snapshot in time approach”, and is used by DME 
Regional Office to review and approve the quantum of the financial provision and 
quantum for final closure of the mine. 
 
Several weaknesses in the trust fund method have been noted, and are concerning, 
since the Department admits that this is the predominant method in which financial 
provision is made. The first weakness applies to all of the methods, and centres on the 
fact that no prescription is made on how the Minister should calculate the amount of 
the financial provision to be kept in order to cover the future costs of latent or residual 
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this must therefore also be the case with the other methods available to applicants. 
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environmental impacts, apart from the environmental risk report submitted by the 
holder. ‘Latent environmental impact’ is defined in Regulation 1 to mean “any 
environmental impact that may result from natural events or disasters after the closure 
certificate has been issued”, while ‘residual environmental impact’ is described as “the 
environmental impact remaining after a closure certificate has been issued”. While 
residual impacts can be planned for in the environmental risk report, latent impacts can 
clearly not be accurately forecast, and it is therefore unclear exactly how the Minister 
calculates how much of the financial provision to retain in order to make provision for 
this eventuality. 
 
A further weakness, this time peculiar to the trust fund method of financial provision, is 
that the identity of the trustee of the fund. It seems unlikely that the Minister is named 
as trustee of every trust fund set up in compliance with section 41, but it is unclear 
exactly how access is gained to the funds contained in these vehicles in the event of 
premature closure of the mines.  
 
One question which remains unclear is whether financial provisions are ring-fenced in 
the event of the rights holders being wound up upon becoming insolvent. One of the 
amendments to NEMA which would have been activated by the enactment of the 
Mineral and Resource Development Amendment Act
233
 is section 24P, which deals with 
financial provisions for the remediation of environmental damage stemming from 
prospecting, mining, exploration, production or related activities on the prospecting, 
mining, exploration or production area. In terms of section 24P(6), the Insolvency Act
234
 
does not apply to any form of financial provision, or any amounts arising from such a 
provision. However, since this provision remains inactive, it remains unclear what the 
current situation is with regards to the fate of financial provisions upon insolvency. 
 
What happens to financial provisions upon insolvency is largely determined by the 
nature of the method used to provide the guarantee and the way in which this is 
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carried out. Trust funds which are properly constituted will fall outside of the insolvent 
estate of a mine,
235
 but whether the trust funds which are provided in financial 
provisions meet this criterion would have to be determined with reference to the 
specific instruments. Whether insurance is included in the insolvent estate depends on 
the details of the insurance policy.
236
 As with insurance, the determinant factor of 
whether bank guarantees fall outside of the insolvent estate depends on the details of 
the agreement. It seems reasonable to assume that financial provision by means of 
direct deposit would fall outside of the insolvent estate.  
 
Therefore, despite the fact that it seems most financial provisions would be safe in the 
event of insolvency, a lot depends on the context and the actual instrument used to 
make the ‘payment’, and more certainty is necessary to clear up misunderstandings 
and avoid potential risks. 
 
A final short falling of the entire provision relating to financial provisions relates to the 
amount of time allocated to the carrying out of the studies required to compile the 
EMP, including the determination f the closure plan and the financial provision 
contained therein. Upon application for a mining right, an applicant must carry out an 
environmental impact assessment and submit an EMP within 180 days of the date on 
which he or she is notified by the Regional Manager to do so, according to the 
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 There are numerous elements to be built into the EMP,
238
 including the 
determination of the financial provision, and a mine would be foolish to invest in the 
expensive studies required to create these reports before knowing whether or not they 
qualified for the right they had applied for. Therefore all of the studies and calculations, 
drafting and planning must take place in the period of 180 days, which seems much too 
short a period. This element therefore needs to be extended or somehow made more 
efficient and effective. 
 
3.3.2 Tax-based incentives 
 
On top of the incentive provided to mining companies to rehabilitate the disturbed 
areas and continuously prevent environmental degradation in order to claim back their 
financial provision upon closure of the mine, the state has incentivised the actual 
payment for mining rehabilitation under the Income Tax Act.
239
 Any payment by a 
mining company to another company, association or trust established with the sole 
objectives of complying with the legal obligations imposed on mining operations to 
rehabilitated the mined surface, prevent pollution and protect land and water 
resources, as required by the MPRDA, is tax deductible in terms of section 37A.
240
 This 
essentially means that the right holder’s fulfilment of its obligations to pay its financial 
provision under section 41 of the MPRDA, if in the form of a trust, or its transfer of 
environmental liability to an approved third party for a fee, is tax deductible. A financial 
incentive is also provided for these mining rehabilitation companies and trusts to spend 
their resources on environmental rehabilitation (the very purpose of their existence), 
since if the money is spent on anything other than rehabilitation, the amount is 
deemed taxable in the name of the entity in terms of section 37A(7).241  
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This incentive at best seems tautologous when viewed alongside the performance bond 
built into the MRPDA, and at worst seems to normalise non-compliance with legal 
obligations by mining companies to the point where compliance with the law must be 
incentivised. Even worse is the fact that this tax incentive falls short of the overall 
environmental objective in that there remains widespread non-compliance, with a 
report in 2009 indicating that none of the big gold mining companies operating in the 
West Rand or Far West Rand operate according to an approved EMP, and that there is 
a widespread lack of monitoring.
242
 This climate of non-compliance with statutory 
requirements is also evidenced by the fact that many mines are operating without the 




The environmental objective behind this tool is very narrow, based on its drafting and 
operation. It seems to seek only to ensure that those who are obligated to spend 
money on mining rehabilitation by law in fact do so. The incentive therefore seems only 
to encourage minimum rehabilitation to achieve compliance with the existing legal 
requirements. If this is indeed its aim, it is in fact a negative element in that it seems to 
indicate that the only penalty for non-compliance with legislated obligations would be 
the loss of the tax incentive to do so.  
 
The narrow objectives could be broadened by changing the focus of this tax-based 
incentive from bare compliance to going above and beyond the existing legal 
requirements under the MPRDA and individual EMPs. By creating an incentive to go 
beyond the required level of rehabilitation, the quality and consistency of rehabilitation 
in the mining sector could be increased, and a more important and positive 
environmental objective could be achieved. Further, by encouraging mining companies 
to exceed the levels of rehabilitation agreed to in their EMPs and therefore statutorily 
required before their performance bonds may be returned, the dominant mind-set 
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Chapter 4: Market-based instruments and mining in 
foreign jurisdictions – some options for South Africa  
 
While South Africa is just beginning to introduce market-based instruments as tools to 
fill some of the gaps left by command-and-control measures in the environmental 
context, other jurisdictions have been experimenting with these devices for the last 
two decades, and several lessons may be learnt from their experiences. Some of these 
jurisdictions already use these tools in the mining context, while others use tools in 
other environmental spheres which could be adapted to fit South Africa’s needs in the 
context of mining management. In some cases, such as performance bonds and 
environmental taxes, South Africa is already using these tools, but could improve their 
implementation. In other instances new tools are examined as possible introductions 
into the South African legislative framework. Five types of instruments used in foreign 
jurisdictions will be discussed. These are performance bonds, environmental funds, 
environmental tax, tax incentives and mitigation banking. 
 
4.1 Performance Bonds 
 
The performance bond is one of the most important weapons in the South African 
government’s arsenal in its fight against environmental degradation caused by 
mining.
244
 However, the implementation of this tool has several weaknesses and 
lessons can be learnt from other jurisdictions use of this instrument in order to improve 
the government’s risk cover in this regard.
245
 Further, although the mechanism exists to 
require rehabilitation funds to be established under three key South African laws,
246
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they are only utilised in the mining context, and therefore “[e]xtending their current 




The performance bond or guarantee (also known as the environmental bond) is a 
financial guarantee submitted by a firm ex ante to incentivise compliance with specified 
targets, objectives and permitting conditions.
248
 These bonds originate from the 
material user fees, where a firm is required to post a bond covering any potential 
environmental damage in order to force them to internalise perceived social (or 
environmental) costs into their private resource allocation decisions.
249
 Not only do 
they provide an incentive for firms to meet the targets set by the state in order to 
secure the return of the whole or part of the bond, but they ensure that the funds exist 
to indemnify the state against the future environmental costs of the firm’s current 
activities, should they cause environmental damage, with the bond increasing in 
proportion to the perceived potential risk.
250
 This form of MBI is a valuable tool in 
encouraging firms to spend money on mitigation measures and the minimisation of 
their environmental externalities in order to benefit financially in the long run,251 and 
results in prevention of environmental degradation rather than ex post facto 
rehabilitation.  
 
Performance bonds have been successfully used in foreign jurisdictions in the mining 
context to ensure that companies rehabilitate the disturbed surface and minimise 
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environmental degradation throughout the life of the mine.
252
 As is the case in South 
Africa, both the United States of America and Australia have historical legacies of 
abandoned mines, and these governments therefore also exhibit a heightened 
preparedness for mine closure, which our country has aspired to imitate.
253
 The 
performance bond is especially suited to mining rehabilitation, since such reclamation 
occurs when the operation is no longer financially profitable, and the bond acts as an 
assurance that the money set aside for the rehabilitation will be properly spent.254 
 
In the United States of America, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA)
255
 requires operators to post a bond as a condition to mine coal.
256
 The 
quantum of the bond must be sufficient to perform the rehabilitation if it is forfeited 
and the regulatory authority must do the work, and the value is determined based on 
the “worst case method”.
257
 This surface mining bond ensures that the disturbed land 
is reclaimed, either by the operator or by a third party, and is only released after the 
mining and reclamation operations have been inspected by the regulatory authority.
258
 
However, even in this developed country the value of the bonds is often insufficient to 
reclaim the disturbed land fully, and additional funding must be used from 
supplemental state funds.
259
 The country also suffers from a plethora of abandoned 
mines, with 17 000 in Colorado alone.
260
 The SMCRA also sets up an Abandoned Mine 
Reclamation Fund
261
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Some key differences between this system and the one used in South African mining 
regulation is that cost of the rehabilitation is estimated by the regulator, rather than 
the mining company, and surety companies may come forward to pay the bond, acting 
as insurance companies in the bonding of surface coal mines.
263
 By doing the estimate 
of how much rehabilitation will cost, taking into account the worst case scenario, the 
state is able to better protect itself against the risk of having to cover the expense of 
the rehabilitation, and by allowing surety companies to post the bonds for mining 
companies, the state outsources some of the legwork in investigating the mining 
companies’ financial credentials. 
 
Western Australia also uses performance bonds in the mining context, holding these 
guarantees pending appropriate rehabilitation and final relinquishment of the mining 
lease.
264
 The bonds are paid to the state mining authority, to be repaid after successful 
rehabilitation, creating a financial incentive to ensure that rehabilitation is carried out 
and providing a source of funds for remediation efforts in the event of a corporate 
failure of a mining venture or abandonment.265 In 2009 the Western Australian mining 
industry had around $800 million w rth of performance bonds held against it by the 
government on grounds of environmental performance.
266
 However, the government 
conservatively estimates that this represents, on average, only 25 per cent of the total 
costs of rehabilitation.
267
 This is due to the level of investment in the mining sector, the 
increase in scientific knowledge regarding environmental impacts and long-term effects 
of mining, and the increase in the communities’ expectations of mining rehabilitation 
standards.
268
 One of the suggestions put forward by the government of Western 
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A major drawback is that the Australian regulatory environment in which these 
performance bonds are situated does not specify water quality guidelines, leading to 
problems after rehabilitation has occurred.
270
 In this respect South Africa is in fact 
ahead of Australia, since the Department of Water Affairs must approve closure plans 
and environmental risk management plans, under the MPRDA, before closure 
certificates are issued to mines, thus allowing performance bonds (in whole or in part) 
to be returned to the right holder. However, the actual oversight in this regard is weak, 
as evidenced by the existing acid mine drainage problem currently being experienced in 
South Africa, and the lesson to be learnt from Australia’s example is that the inter-
departmental co-operation between the Department of Mineral Resources and of 
Water Affairs is key in ensuring environmental standards and avoiding expensive future 
rehabilitation and treatment efforts by the state. 
 
4.2 Environmental Funds 
 
The ringfencing or earmarking of revenue is sometimes argued to be out of step with 
sound financial policy,
271
 and the South African National Treasury has stated that it 
does not support full earmarking of revenues generated from environmental taxes.
272
 
However, environmental funds can be used as an effective tool to achieve 
environmental management and to increase state expenditure on environmental 
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 especially where socio-economic spending always seems to appear above 
environmental needs on the budgetary agenda.  
 
An environmental fund is a financial mechanism set up to achieve certain 
environmental objectives, and can be structured in several different ways.
274
 They are 
particularly appropriate where the issues being addressed are long-term and require a 
sustained response over a number of years, where existing agencies cannot effectively 
manage the amount of funds needed to address the problem, leading to the need for 
an independent administrative body, among other things.
275
 Although they are 
generally funded by the state or international sources, a trust fund system can be used 
which imposes a tax or fee on a particular activity in order to create a fund dedicated to 
environmental undertakings.
276
 These are especially effective when the earmarked 
funds are of an insurance pooling nature (ie insurance premium taxes). Although it is a 
relatively small pool of countries in which taxes are levied on industries or groups to 
fund insurance pools against potential environmental risks associated with the 
production or use of the taxed products, both the United States of America and Canada 
use this model with success. Since statutory funds already exist in South Africa,277 such 
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Perhaps the best know environmental fund is the Superfund
279
 in the United States of 
America, which is funded through an excise tax on specified hazardous chemicals.
280
 
The founding legislation set up a large fund to clean up hazardous waste sites where 
parties who had caused the pollution could not be found or were unable to pay.
281
 The 
fund could also be used to clean up sites pending cost recoveries from responsible 
parties, or for emergency spills and imminent hazards requiring immediate action.
282
 
Despite starting off as a temporary program, but the mid-1980s the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) who was tasked with administering the fund, had designated 
hundreds of waste sites as Superfund sites, and had tens of thousands more to 
investigate for potential inclusion into the programme.
283
 However, despite some 
success, the program is becoming unpopular with industry and government, and calls 
resound for its winding up.
284
 Despite some negative views of this mechanism, the tool 
has the potential to overcome many of the shortfalls of the current South African 
legislative framework around mining rehabilitation, in particular the persistent problem 
of acid mine drainage. In fact, the National Treasury recently met with the US Trade 
and Development Agency to discuss the possibility of a future tour of the US by South 





In the mining context in the US, the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund
286
 set up by 
the SMCRA is exactly the kind of fund which is needed in South Africa. The objective of 
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this fund is to reclaim and rehabilitate land and water resources adversely affected by 
past coal mining, and it includes the objective of rehabilitating abandoned surface mine 
areas and land negatively affected by past mining practices.
287
 Revenue is generated 
through user charges, donations, reclamation fees levied on mines
288
 and interest 
earned on the fund.
289
 This kind of fund is exactly what is needed in South Africa, both 
in terms of its objectives and its revenue raising style. 
 
In Manitoba, Canada, an environmental contingency fund is created by the 
Environment Act,
290
 to be used at the request of the minister of the environment in 
cases of environmental emergency, and is funded by the revenues generated by the 
sale of emissions rights for designated pollutants.
291
 This model therefore uses the 
revenue from an existing MBI (the emission rights) to fund an environmental trust 
fund, and is the type of instrument which is argued below to be necessary in South 
Africa. 
 
The Western Australian government has put forward an environmental fund as an 
option for consideration as an alternative to the performance guarantees (ie 
environmental bonds) which are currently required.
292
 Each mining operator would be 
required to contribute to the Mining Security Fidelity Fund, and would have to cover 
the cost of their own rehabilitation and closure expenses, but would not have to 
provide a performance guarantee. The fund would then be used by the government to 
cover the closure costs on those sites where it is obligated to undertake work as a 
result of the company being unable to fulfil its obligations.
293
 This model is put forward 
here as appropriate and desirable for use in South Africa, apart from the fact that the 
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performance bond is taken out of the equation. Where the performance bond is 
required on top of the contribution into the fund, there is a higher likelihood that 
enough money will be set aside for the purposes of rehabilitation and closure of mining 
sites. Since the bond is returned once the mining company’s obligations have been 
met, and since the obligation to rehabilitate and close the mine remains unchanged, 
the performance bond does not cost the mining company more money, but places the 
state in at a lesser risk of having to take on the company’s obligations. This heightened 
security also means that there is likely to be more money available in the fund for the 
rehabilitation of ownerless and abandoned mines. 
 
Several important lessons can be learnt from both the use of environmental funds in 
the US and Canada, and the shortfallings in these systems. The nature of an 
environmental fund is key in dealing with long-term and perpetual environmental 
problems such as hazardous waste contamination and acid mine drainage. This tool is 
used in the US to fund the clean-up of sites which need emergency action, of where the 
responsible parties cannot be traced. This mechanism therefore provides the specific 
agency tasked with the clean-up immediate access to funds and a means of acting 
without having to be dependent on the general budget. This is a key design aspect 
which is needed in the South African mining industry, which is currently dependent on 
the national Budget to fund the treatment and avoidance of acid mine drainage and 
the rehabilitation of ownerless and abandoned mines. The reliance on the tax payer 
alone to foot the bill for the necessary rehabilitation falls foul of the polluter pays 
principle enshrined in NEMA,
294
 and the costs of controlling the rising water levels in 
old gold mines, treating polluted water and rehabilitating ownerless and abandoned 
mines is astronomical.295 The fund in Canada demonstrates a simple and effective 
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means of revenue raising, through the conjunctive use of two separate MBIs, and this 
form of collaboration is put forward as the right design for the South African 
environmental fund and its revenue raising techniques. Another option for raising 
revenue is the direct contribution by current mines, as is the case in the option put 
forward by the Western Australian government. Although this option is more 
straightforward and involves less administration, it is likely to garner less public 
support, and less co-operation from the mining industry. However, with education and 
co-operation with all stakeholders, this option could be viable and desirable. 
 
4.3 Environmental Tax 
 
As with performance bonds, environmental tax is already in use in South Africa 
(although not in the mining context). In fact, it is the preferred tool in the National 
Treasury’s toolbox, and is capable of raising revenue for the state whilst accomplishing 
environmental goals. The environmentally-related Pigouvian296 tax seeks to correct the 
market price of a good or service by imposing a tax equivalent to the cost of the 
negative environmental externality.
297
 This category covers several types of charges 
and fees, as well as product taxes, and is widely used worldwide either to achieve 
environmental objectives or to raise revenue. Environmental taxes may be applied to 
industrial inputs (ie resources consumed), on pollution emissions discharged into the 
environment, or on waste, and can also be applied at the point of consumption by 
individual purchasers (although this is much more administratively difficult).
298
 They are 
primarily imposed on the energy in the transport and heating sectors, as well as 
vehicles and electricity.
299
 There has been an increasing use of environmental taxes and 
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similar instruments across the OECD, with taxes amounting to around 2% of the GDP 




A topical environmental tax which is being either considered or implemented in several 
jurisdictions is carbon tax. Countries currently considering the introduction of such a 
tax include Canada and South Africa,
301
 while Australia is set to introduce carbon tax in 
July 2012.302 Several European countries have already implemented this MBI, including 





The advantage of this kind of tax environmental is its potential ‘double dividend’ 
through the recycling of revenue received from environmental taxes in order to reduce 
taxes on ‘goods’ such as labour.
304
 The second dividend usually results in an increase in 
welfare or GDP, or a decrease in unemployment, since the scope exists for the 
decrease of taxes on income, while the first dividend achieves the environmental 
objective behind the tax.305 In this way the tool achieves supreme efficiency, since a 
single tool manages to achieve several goals. 
 
Although the South African government is clearly well aware of the advantages of 
environmental taxes, they could be used more effectively in the mining context as a 
device to slow the use of non-renewable minerals, and as a method of raising revenue 
to invest in an environmental fund to assist in efforts to rehabilitate abandoned and 
ownerless mines, as well as to treat acid mine drainage. By introducing an 
environmental tax in the mining context, the price mechanism internalises the cost to 
the environment (although the full price of the environmental degradation may not be 
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302
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 slowing resource use, and the need for rehabilitation is therefore 
decreased. Revenue is raised for use either in the general fiscus, or in a ringfenced fund 
to achieve specific environmental purposes. 
 
4.4 Tax Incentives 
 
Another tax-based MBI, these tools use tax incentives to encourage desired behaviour 
rather than to build the externality into the price of items, as the previous tool did. 
These tax benefits, also known as tax differentiation, come in the form of tax 
deductions or write-offs, credits and subsidies of environmentally desirable behaviour, 
and are widely used as they can easily be built into existing regulatory systems. 
 
Examples of this type of tool abound, both in South Africa and in other jurisdictions. In 
Europe, countries have used tax differentiation to reduce vehicle-related emissions by 
encouraging the switch from leaded to unleaded petrol and by encouraging clean car 
sales, which it can be argued led to a drastic reduction in the market share of leaded 
petrol in Europe between 1985 and 1995.
307
 A type of tax differentiation tool is 
accelerated depreciation, which allows the capital expenditure incurred through the 
acquisition of a given item to be set off against business income more rapidly than 
would otherwise be permissible.
308
 Accelerated depreciation is used in Canada in 
relation to eligible pollution-control equipment,
309
 as well as in Germany and France for 
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South Africa also uses the tool of accelerated depreciation, along with several other tax 
incentives. In the mining context, tax incentives are used to encourage compliance with 
mining companies’ obligations to rehabilitate mines, and to spend the money set aside 
by them for this purpose on the correct activities.311 However, as discussed above, the 
tool currently has a very narrow environmental objective, and negatively impacts the 
regulation of the mining sector by seemingly needing to incentivise compliance with 
legal obligations. 
 
Although these tax incentives are already in place in South Africa, they could be better 
utilised in the mining context to overcome several of the weaknesses in the current 
regulatory regime. The lessons to be learnt from other jurisdictions is mainly that this 
tool needs to be utilised more, with a specific focus on changing the behaviour of 
mining companies without damaging the economy.312  
 
 
4.5 Mitigation Banking 
 
The concept of mitigation banking is used in the United States of America in relation to 
the conservation of valuable ecosystems, especially wetlands, and uses a ‘no net loss’ 
approach.313 Under this concept, all wetland losses should be avoided, and where 
losses are impossible to prevent, they must be minimised and offset by corresponding 
increases in the protection and/or the development of other wetlands.
314
 In order to 
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enable development which cannot avoid wetland losses to take place, an incentive 
needs to exist in order to encourage the private sector to protect biodiversity – this is 
achieved through wetland mitigation banking.
315
 A ‘mitigation bank’ is created, which 
purchases and restores degraded wetlands, or in certain cases creates approved 
wetlands, and credits are calculated and stored; developers can then purchase these 
credits and withdraw them from the bank to compensate for wetland filling 
elsewhere.316 Since the wetlands which are being filled in by developers are being 
‘replaced’ by the banks, there is no ‘net loss’ of wetland overall, since the areas 
purchased by the banks must be kept in perpetuity as wetlands. This practice is now 
widespread in the US since the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, and has 





However, this system is difficult to incentivise, since profit margins are not dependable, 
and some environmental critics of the banking system not that wetlands are difficult to 
build, and that failure of manmade wetlands is common.318 Further, there is no legal 
mechanism to ensure that the ‘banks’ are financially sustained over time, leading to the 
fear that since they are difficult to physically maintain in the long run, the wetlands will 
not be conserved in perpetuity, and the valuable ecosystem will be lost despite the 
state’s efforts.
319
 Despite some difficulties, mitigation banks which take over large 
areas have succeeded, and are even argued to be environmentally superior to many 
small, isolated wetland parcels.
320
 Furthermore, legal instruments can be put in place 
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to maintain the banked areas in perpetuity, and this MBI can be coupled with others to 
strengthen weaknesses inherent in it. 
 
Offsets, which were first formalised in the USA in the 1970s for wetland mitigation, are 
a more crude version of mitigation banking, and are now used globally, including in 
South Africa, in order to mitigate the loss of biodiversity due to development.
321
 In New 
South Wales, the government has passed a bill which provides for negotiation for 
‘biodiversity banking and offsets’ in order to address native vegetation clearing for 
urbanisation and the resultant biodiversity loss.
322
 Using this tool, residents can 
generate ‘biodiversity credits’ if they commit to enhance and protect biodiversity 
values on their land, and these credits can then be sold to offset the likely impacts on 
biodiversity values due to development.
323
 In South Africa, the concept of offsets is 
relatively new, but is being used in the context of biodiversity.
324
 The Western Cape 





 which offers guidance on the meaning and use of biodiversity offsets. The 
Provincial Guideline on Biodiversity Offsets also sets out means to calculate the size327 
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 of the offset, the design process
329
 and long-term planning
330
 to be 
followed and key considerations in the evaluation of offset proposals.
331
 This tool is 
also being slowly introduced into the mining context internationally, with the 
International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) proposing the use of biodiversity 
offsets,
332
 and several countries are legislating the use of offsets (either as mandatory 
or advisory) as part of their conservation and sustainable development 
requirements.333  Offsets may be the only way for mining companies to meet states’ 
objectives of limiting biodiversity loss, since mining may have to take place in 
ecologically sensitive areas, and mitigation of the residual impacts of mining may be 




Despite their widespread use, however, certain weaknesses do exist in the offset 
programs, and specifically in the biodiversity bank initiative in New Zealand. Firstly, 
there is flawed logic in offsetting one area for development with another for 
conservation, since the ecosystem lost may not be offset with something of 
conservation value.335 This is especially true in areas such as the Western Cape, which 
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are biodiversity rich, but in which many species are severely threatened and may only 
occur in one area. The Provincial Guideline on Biodiversity Offsets take these concerns 
into consideration, but fail to substantially solve the problem, since offsets are still 
allowed off site, and in certain instances monetary compensation is allowed.
336
 
Secondly, where restoration efforts in creating offsets target sites of deforestation, 
mining or development, it is unrealistic to assume that the full suite of ecosystem 
services can be restored, given the current state of the science.337 Several other 
weaknesses have been raised in relation to this tool, including the basis for determining 
the value of biodiversity and the lack of management and compliance of offsets. 
 
Despite certain weaknesses, the idea of mitigation or biodiversity banking is one which 
could be usefully adapted to the South African mining context, and the idea has been 
implemented recently.
338
 However, given the weaknesses which have been highlighted, 
much work will have to be done to ensure that South African biodiversity and natural 
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Chapter 5: Amending and/or extending the use of 
market-based instruments in South Africa’s mining 
regime – looking towards the future 
 
The current regulation of environmental rehabilitation in South Africa’s mining industry 
through MBIs is not working. This fact is evidenced by an abundance of ownerless and 
abandoned mines, a growing acid mine drainage problem which is threatening to 
mature into a potential disaster, both environmentally and economically, and 
widespread acknowledgement that mines are still one of the leading causes of 
environmental degradation.  
 
This failure is due to the narrow scope of the MBIs currently in place, which leave gaps 
and inefficiencies in the regulatory framework, and there is much scope for 
improvement. However, since the National Treasury has advocated for the increased 
use of MBIs,
339
 such improvement seems eminently possible. Several incentive-based 
tools exist both within and outside of this jurisdiction which could be used to shore up 
the rehabilitation regulations.
340
 In this way, an environment can be created which 
encourages on-going and thorough environmental rehabilitation in the mining sector, 
as well as creating tools to begin to repair some of the damage caused in the past and 
to ensure that it is remedied sufficiently to realise everyone’s environmental right. 
 
In order to evaluate the suitability of the five tools identified as potentially apposite for 
South Africa’s mining rehabilitation needs and existing regulatory framework, I will use 
the eight criteria identified by academics
341
 and the National Treasury, highlighted in 
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Chapter 3. These criteria are: environmental effectiveness, technical and administrative 
issues, legislative aspects, policy, legal and institutional alignment, public support, tax 
revenue, distributional impact and competitiveness impacts. Furthermore, the tax-
based incentives must conform to the generally accepted principles of good taxation – 




5.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
 
In order to be suitable as a tool, the incentive-based instrument which has been 
selected for a task must be environmentally effective, which is to say there must be a 
direct and rational link between the instrument and the environmental objective it 
seeks to achieve.
343
 The stronger the link between the instrument and the objective, 
the more likely it will be to change the intended behaviour, and the fewer unintended 
side effects will occur.344 
 
The five instruments discussed in Chapter Four range from those seeking to achieve 
broad environmental objectives to those seeking to achieve narrow environmental 
goals. In the case of broad objectives, there may be certain instances where a direct 
link the instrument and the objective is not feasible, and in such a circumstances policy-
makers should ensure that the next closest alternate link is used, and that any 
exemptions are kept to a minimum.
345
 Both tax-based incentives, in the form of 
environmental taxes and tax incentives or benefits, can be viewed as seeking to achieve 
broad environmental objectives, and the imposition of these instruments runs the risk 
of causing unexpected consequences.  The environmental fund also runs the risk of not 
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meeting the environmental effectiveness criteria, since the funding proposed for this 
instrument is one of the previous two tools, and there could therefore be a knock-on 
effect, despite the fact that the tool itself can be created with a relatively narrow 
environmental objective. 
 
The final two instruments – performance bonds and mitigation banking – both meet 
the criteria of environmental effectiveness well, having narrow environmental 
objectives and having a direct link between themselves and the goal they seek to 
achieve. Therefore, as with all instrument choices, careful planning must be ensured, 
especially in the case of the first three MBIs examined, since they have the highest 
chance of causing unexpected consequences. 
 
5.2 Technical and Administrative Viability 
 
Various technical and administrative prerequisites stand in the way of MBIs succeeding, 
and must be built into the instruments to ensure that they achieve their goal and are 




 describes these obstacles 
as follows: first, the instruments should be designed in such a way as to ensure 
certainty and simplicity in order to facilitate their implementation and to minimise the 
confusion on the part of the administrator and the public. Secondly, he advises that 
they should be designed in such a way as to minimise the cost of implementation and 
enforcement.
348
 This is in line with the argument that one of the reasons to introduce 
MBIs is to minimise administrative cost and burden,349 and that they should therefore 
do so as much as possible. This cost saving and administrative streamlining can most 
easily be achieved by building new MBIs into existing legal, administrative and 
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institutional frameworks, where possible.
350
 Thirdly, the new tools should not be too 
expensive to comply with, since this will encourage public support, and will also lessen 
enforcement costs.
351
 Finally, the tool should be uniformly applicable, reducing 
regional variances or competition which could be open to abuse both by administrators 
or subjects.
352
 However, this prerequisite should not extinguish one of the advantages 
of the MBI – the flexibility to adapt to a specific context. 
 
The five tools put forward as potential growth areas in the effort to make 
environmental regulation in the mining context more effective range in terms of how 
far they are from achieving this criterion. Performance bonds are both certain and 
simple, and since they already exist in the legal framework. There is therefore little to 
no implementation and enforcement cost, or extra compliance cost. The changes which 
have been suggested
353
 are merely in how this tool is applied, and it therefore meets 
this criterion.  The same can be said to an extent for the suggestions of environmental 
tax and tax incentives, since both tools are currently in place in South Africa, and 
should simply be extended to achieve environmental goals in the mining sector.354 
Several levies have been introduced under the Customs and Excise Act355 to achieve 
environmental ends, and this existing legal, administrative and institutional framework 
can therefore be built on. Various precedents also exist for tax incentives used to 
achieve environmental objectives, on which the fourth tool to achieve environmental 
objectives in the mining sector can build.
356
 These include several amendments to the 
Income Tax Act
357
 in an attempt to ease the financial burden on industry seeking to 
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comply with the new environmental regime in South Africa,
358
 such as the deduction 
for income tax purposes of the expense incurred in acquiring ‘environmental treatment 
and recycling assets’.
359
  However, care must be taken with the environmental tax to 
ensure that tax avoidance behaviour is dealt with in the design, and that the tax rate is 




The proposed environmental fund would be more difficult to build into the existing 
legal and administrative framework, and would need its own institution created from 
scratch. However, although such a fund is not currently in existence in South Africa, the 
idea has been put forward by the National Treasury
361
 as one means of using fiscal 





The benchmarks listed by the National Treasury as indicating where environmental 
funds would be appropriate
363
 are also met in the South African mining context: the 
problem is one which requires a long-term and sustained response, especially in the 
case of acid mine drainage, which is perpetual in nature; the existing agencies also 
cannot effectively implement the amount of funds needed to address the problem;
364
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and there is support for the fund from all relevant stakeholders, particularly 
government.
365
 A report commissioned by the Department of Mineral Resources on the 
acid mine drainage problem in 2010 seems to confirm that government would view an 
environmental fund dedicated to dealing with the AMD problem favourably.
366
 Coupled 
with the seeming agreement with environmental funds where the aim is to raise 
revenue for environmental spending rather than to change behaviour, it seems there is 
a real chance of an environmental fund with the objective of rehabilitating ownerless 
and abandoned mines and treating AMD being successful.367  
 
On the creation of revenue-raising tools to fund an environmental fund, one option is 
to earmark all or part of the royalties already levied on all minerals recovered in the 
Republic.
368
 This mechanism would meet the criteria of using existing legislative, 
administrative and institutional frameworks, and negative impacts on the economy 
would be minimised in light of the fact that such a levy is already in place. Another 
option is for the state to provide the revenue for the fund directly, and the mechanism 
for this is already in place under the MPRDA, which allows Parliament to set aside 
funds for environmental rehabilitation in the mining context.369 
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One drawback of state funds which are not insurance-based, as the proposed 
environmental fund would be if it dealt with historical restoration of abandoned and 
ownerless mines and AMD, is that it potentially offends the polluter pays principle and 
could be inequitable.
370
 The argument can be advanced that existing operations alone 
should not themselves be held responsible for the cost of pollution which arose in the 
past where no legal liability can be attached to any person, or where the polluter 
cannot be traced.371 However, the mining industry has profited from the lax 
environmental governance of the past, and it could be argued that although requiring 
them to pay for the pollution of past users is a ‘course kind of justice’,
372
 it is justified. 
 
The proposed use of mitigation banking is perhaps the least able to fit into the existing 
frameworks. However, biodiversity offsets are beginning to form part of the South 
African legislative landscape, and are being used in planning tools created under 
NEMBA at both a national and provincial level.
373
 The cost of administration of 
mitigation banks would be kept low, since they would be private enterprises, and the 
legal mechanisms needed to ensure protection in perpetuity are already built into the 
existing legislation around protected areas.374 Existing legal protection in the form of 
title deed restrictions could also be utilised by individual property owners in this 
context. Owners are able to control what happens to the property in the future 
through registering a title deed restriction in relation to their property, in this case in 
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relation to maintaining a certain level of biodiversity and ecosystem functionality, and 




Therefore, although they require different levels of effort to work into existing 
legislative, institutional and administrative frameworks, and in some cases require new 
bodies to be created or laws to be enacted, all of the suggested MBIs are capable of 
overcoming the technical and administrative issues before them. 
 
5.3 Legislative Aspects 
 
Ensuring a coherent legislative framework is another prerequisite to ensure the 
successful introduction of incentive-based instruments into a regulatory regime.
376
 
Given South Africa’s comprehensive legislative framework, as well as the entrenched 
environmental right in the Constitution, with which all legislation must comply, this 
criteria is perhaps the least difficult to meet. The broad legislative framework already in 
existence appears able to cater for the introduction of all of the new instruments, and 
amendments to existing statutes which have been suggested
377
 to accommodate the 
introduction of MBIs should fit into this scheme with relative ease.
378
 The broad 
regulatory framework already exists and is capable of accommodating all of the 
necessary changes.  
 
Since the performance bond, environmental tax and tax incentives already exist,
379
 
these tools do not pose much of a challenge to integrate into the legal framework. 
However, especially in the case of tax, care must be taken to avoid negative incentives 
                                                           
375
 Van der Merwe & Pope “Servitudes and other real rights” in du Boise (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 2007 602. 
376
 Paterson “An Incentive-Based Approach to Environmental Regulation” in Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa 331. 
377
 See 4.1 to 4.5 above. 
378
 Paterson “An Incentive-Based Approach to Environmental Regulation” in Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa 331. 
379
 See 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4 above. In the case of the performance bond, amendments to the MPRDA will be 
sufficient. However, with environmental tax and tax incentives, more drastic amendments to the existing 
laws in which these instruments appear may have to be undertaken, and new statutes could be 












being created. These may clash with the broader legislative aims and policy directions, 
and may therefore not sit well with other areas of governance. The mechanisms for 
creating statutory funds already exist, and an environmental fund is under 
consideration by the National Treasury as one option in tackling the AMD problems and 
ownerless and abandoned mine rehabilitation.
380
 The mitigation banking tool can be 
built into mechanisms which make provision for biodiversity offsets, with the 
difference between the two mechanisms being minor. 
 
Any MBIs which are introduced must also comply with the country’s international and 
regional obligations.
381
 However, the government is well aware of this aspect in the 
introduction of MBIs, and will need to ensure that both environmental and trade 
objectives are aligned.
382
 It can therefore safely be assumed that any new or adjusted 
MBI would be compatible with regional and international obligations before the 
government introduced it into the regulatory framework. 
 
5.4 Policy, Legal and Institutional Alignment 
 
The alignment of new MBIs with the broader policy, legislative and institutional 
framework is essential in ensuring that the new tool succeeds, and that it is compatible 
with the overall objectives of the existing system.
383
 Although the environmental 
objectives of the proposed MBIs are clearly in line with the goals of environmental 
protection contained in section 24 of the Constitution, there is a chance that such 
instruments, in taking revenue away from the general stream, might not align with the 
national socio-economic policy objectives which seek to achieve economic growth, job 
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creation and poverty alleviation.
384
 However, if there is careful consideration of the 
design of each instrument, and if the tenets of sustainable development are respected, 
there is no reason why each of the proposed instruments should not meet this 
criterion. 
 
Since performance bonds are relatively narrow, they affect the mines almost 
exclusively, and therefore meet this criterion the most easily of all the tools. Mitigation 
banking is also relatively narrow, but could possibly clash with the socio-economic 
imperatives such as housing. This should therefore be taken into account in the design 
of this tool. Tax incentives seem narrow in focus, but are in reality a write-off of certain 
tax by the government in the interest of achieving a larger goal. However, in a country 
such as South Africa, which has a limited tax base, such a move must be carefully 
considered, and all of the effects must be weighed against the benefits derived from 
this tool. Finally, environmental taxes and environmental funds are the tools which 
potentially clash with this criterion the most. Since the National Treasury is generally 
opposed to ring-fencing of funds, and is careful about what taxes it imposes, it can be 
assumed that the suggestion of the introduction of these two MBIs has come with 
careful consideration of their potential effects, and provision should be made for the 
mitigation of negative impacts. 
 
Although all of the MBIs seem to be in line with the environmental objectives, and can 
assist in overcoming many of the weaknesses of the existing regulatory system,
385
 
traditional compliance and enforcement tools should still be invested in. There is a 
danger in assuming that a MBI by itself can achieve the desired policy goals, since 
without a powerful and adequately enforced regulatory framework, unexpected 
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There should also be as much certainty as possible on the consequences which will flow 
from the introduction of any measure in order to achieve the stated objectives with the 
maximum amount of efficiency.
387
 To ensure this, there should also be as much cross-
consultation as possible between relevant environmental and fiscal authorities during 




Linked to this, and imperative in ensuring the success of the new regime, will be the 
achievement of co-operative governance. This is currently lacking between the 
Departments of Water and Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources, as evidenced 
by the discussion of MaccSands case
389
 and the issues around the moving of 
environmental authorisations in the mining context into the realm of the Department 
of Environmental Affairs.
390
 This is happening despite being a constitutional imperative 
to ensure co-operative governance,
391
 and it is essential that a better working 
relationship is formed between the provincial and national environmental bodies, as 
well as between the national departments, especially Environmental Affairs and 
Mineral Resources.392 
 
5.5 Public Support 
 
As with most new laws which require the public to behave in a certain way, the success 
of incentive-based instruments is often dependent on accruing public support prior to 
its implementation.
393
 However, most of the MBIs which have been outlined above will 
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impose additional costs, especially on industries, but also individuals and organisations. 
However, these tools are necessary to fund government activities, and to provide 
public goods and services, as well as to achieve necessary environmental objectives 
which will benefit everyone in the long run, either directly or indirectly.
394
 Only in the 
case of tax incentives and performance bonds are the incentives positive, while the 
mitigation banking, environmental fund and environmental tax would all require 
additional outlay by those affected. 
 
In order to try to win public support, the government should ensure that the 
environmental objectives and how they relate to the instrument are made clear to the 
public. The instrument should therefore be clear, simple, and easy to use and 
administer, and should be explained to the clearly identified stakeholders.
395
 Further, 
all relevant stakeholders should be engaged in the assessment process, and gradual 





The process of garnering public supp rt for some tools will be easier than others. The 
performance bonds and tax-based instruments are already in existence, and are 
therefore not alien to the public. These should therefore be easier to introduce, and 
meet the criteria relatively well, since only the changes in environmental objective 
sought to be achieved needs to be thoroughly explained. The environmental fund could 
prove difficult to win the mining industry over with, but considering the fact that it is 
clearly necessary in the context of rehabilitation of ownerless and abandoned mines 
and acid mine drainage, and the fact that industry will be asked to contribute to this 
process whatever the type of tool used, support could be achieved eventually. In the 
case of mitigation banking, the idea is not entirely foreign in this country, with offsets 
already being used in biodiversity conservation during the environmental impact 
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 as well as being integrated into various planning tools.
398
 
Biodiversity offsets are being proposed internationally by the International Council on 
Mining and Minerals as a key mitigation tool and an important part of an industry 
which has such serious effects on the environment in general, and biodiversity 
specifically.
399
 Voluntary biodiversity offsets have been entered into in South Africa by 
mining companies, and are an important means of ensuring that key ecosystems are 
conserved.400 Therefore with enough involvement of the stakeholders, even the 
mitigation banking tool can meet the criteria of public support. 
 
5.6 Tax Revenue 
 
Determining the level of taxation or charge to levy on goods in order to either raise 
revenue or internalise an externality in order to influence behaviour through the price 
mechanisms is a key design criterion, and may determine the success or failure of a 
tool.401 This is because there are implications for taxes or incentives that are set too 
high or too low. Where a tax is set too high in respect of a product for which there is an 
inelastic demand, consumption patterns may not change (although revenue may be 
easily raised) while a rate which is set too low may not achieve the objective which the 
MBI sets out to achieve.
402
 Therefore the process of setting the rate must be as 
scientific as possible, and must undergo a rigorous cost-benefit analysis to ensure that 
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Tax incentives and performance bonds, as positive incentives, are least likely to offend 
this criterion (although as tax incentives which are too high risk affecting the national 
revenue amount). Mitigation banking may impose a limited cost, depending on how 
much it costs the mines to establish these banks, and this will have to be taken into 
account when designing the tool. The environmental fund will vary in its compliance 
with this criterion depending on its design, but whether the state contributes to the 
fund or the mines make direct contributions, either in the form of tax or charge, this 
MBI must be carefully constructed so as not to negatively affect the economy. 
 
In the case of environmental taxes (by themselves and as a tool to raise revenue for the 
environmental fund), there is a potential to place a great burden on industry, which 
could in turn hamper economic growth, especially in a mining industry which provides 
as many jobs as it does in the South African economy. Henderson404 argues that in the 
case of the mining industry, fiscal incentives should be applies as far as possible in a 
way that does not have the effect of increasing working costs. However, the economy 
is no longer the most important consideration, and it must be balanced with the need 
to protect the environment. 
 
Although traditional tax theory, and the theory of tax neutrality, favours taxing price 
inelastic goods, which provide revenue without decreasing demand, environmental tax 
is used to mould behaviour (along with raising revenue), and therefore goods which are 
taxed may be price elastic in nature in this context.405 A related issue in the context of 
environmental tax (and especially its potential use as a source of revenue for the 
environmental fund) is the issue or earmarking or ringfencing, which was briefly 
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discussed above. The National Treasury has indicated that it is generally opposed to full 
earmarking of tax revenues given that this places undue constraints on the budget 
process and may lead to inappropriate allocation of resources.
406
 However, given the 
recognised need for environmental protection, and the requirement for some of the 
suggested instruments listed above to be funded by state expenditure, this stance may 
have to change. Indications of the recognition of this possibility have appeared in 
recent policy documents which support partial earmarking of revenue,407 and 
precedent exists for full earmarking,408 though not in the environmental arena. There is 
therefore hope for the future of at least some form of dedicated revenue to 
environmental objectives. 
 
5.7 Distributional Impacts 
 
Despite the fact that MBIs are more equitable than command-and-control regulations, 
the potential exists for the impact of their introduction to negatively impact low 
income groups. This design criterion is especially pertinent in South Africa, where 
significant inequalities exist between different sectors of society, and the price 
mechanism could prove to add to the already difficult task facing those at the lower 
end of the income scale.
409
 Ideally, the design of a new instrument should insure that 
the costs associated with its implementation are equitably and proportionally 




Where the cost is directly levied on the mining companies, such as by means of tax 
incentives, performance bonds and mitigation banking, the effects are less likely to be 
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felt by those at the lower end of the economic scale. However, environmental tax and 
the environmental fund have the potential to unfairly burden the poor, and mitigation 
measures may be necessary. Such measures have been considered in the context of 
carbon tax, and solutions suggested included personal income tax relief, in combination 
with or instead of higher transfers to poorer households in the form of effective and 
targeted roll-out of free basic services and block tariffs for both water and electricity.
411
 
Using the double dividends theory and tax shifting, by imposing environmental tax, the 
possibility exists to decrease the taxes on ‘goods’ such as labour and business, and in so 




5.8 Competitiveness Impacts 
 
It is clearly not in the country’s best interests to undermine the ability of local industry 
to compete in domestic and foreign markets, and negative incentive-based tools risk 
doing just this.413 Since the price mechanism inherently raises the cost of production, 
and therefore has the potential to negatively impact foreign competitiveness, this 
criterion must be carefully considered and research must be conducted into the extent 
to which this threat exists before a new MBI is introduced. Where such impacts on 
competiveness are deemed ex ante to be unacceptable, mitigation measures may need 
to be considered and introduced.
414
 However, the environmental objectives sought to 
be achieved must be kept in mind, and the economy must be balanced with 
environmental concerns if true sustainable development is to be achieved. All of the 
five MBIs suggested for amendment or introduction are also already being used 
internationally, most in large jurisdictions which operate competitively. The need to 
remain competitive should therefore not be used as an excuse to avoid taking difficult 
or unpopular decisions, and the MBIs should be introduced despite a possible negative 
impact on competitiveness levels in the short term. 
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In a country with a progressive environmental governance regime and the apparent 
political will to move away from the protection of the economy at the cost of the 
environment to an approach of environmental protection, it is a pity that mining still 
falls largely outside of the laws governing all other industries. However, vast progress 
has been made with the introduction of the MPRDA, and the National Treasury’s 
actions in introducing numerous MBIs in other contexts bode well for the future of 
environmental protection in the mining sphere. There is still a long way to go, and 
several hurdles have been placed in the path of a smooth transition to more stringent 
environmental protection. The most pressing problem is the lack of action regard the 
AMD problem, and the vast drain of the State’s resources caused by the abundance of 
ownerless and abandoned mines, and the resulting environmental degradation. 
However, several options for future growth in environmental protection in the mining 
context are put forward, and all of them are viable and can be accomplished if the 
political will is present. 
  
It is argued in this dissertation that vast scope exists for the improvement of the 
existing MBIs in the mining regulatory framework – the performance bond and tax 
incentives – and that the introduction of some new forms of MBI found in foreign 
jurisdictions, or i  other spheres of South African environmental regulation, would help 
to strengthen the regulation of mining. 
 
In light of the pressing environmental problems of ownerless and abandoned mines 
and AMD, it is argued that an environmental fund dedicated to mining rehabilitation is 
perhaps the most important. This tool would stop the drain on the general fiscus, and 
would enable environmental authorities to carry out the much needed rehabilitation. 
This tool is also suitable for the perpetual nature of AMD management, since the fund 
can live on in perpetuity, long after individual mines have closed. In light of foreign 












taxes or direct contributions from mines, in order to create a more reliable and 
perpetual source of income to fund the rehabilitation of past and present mines in 
which the responsible party is either not traceable, or is unable to undertake this 
rehabilitation. This tool will need to be designed and legislated from scratch, since it 
cannot easily slot into any existing legislation, but statutory funds are not without 
precedent in South Africa. The fact that it will be newly drafted also allows for 
innovation and learning from foreign mistakes, and in light of the fact that we are 
seemingly following the US’s approach to environmental funds, this suggestion bears a 
good chance of succeeding. The suggested model is that of the Abandoned Mine 
Reclamation Fund
415
 in the US, which is funded through a levy on the coal which is 
mined, as well as other avenues, and which is made available to the State to 
rehabilitate mines which would otherwise be left derelict. Since the South African 
government is already in talks with the US on how best to proceed along the lines of 
their Superfund, it is suggested that this model be focused on and expertise and 
knowledge be gathered from the experience of the US. 
 
 The introduction of mitigation banking could ensure that biodiversity and ecosystems 
are conserved, and the use of tax incentives could further encourage positive 
environmental behavioural change and environmental conservation efforts. Since both 
of these tools are already in use in one form or another, the focus of their introduction 
into the mining rehabilitation context (or re-drafting, in the case of the tax incentive) 
will allow for specific targets to be met, and lessons to be learnt from the sectors in 
which these tools are already used. The mitigation banking is especially important in 
South African mining, since the rich biodiversity is threatened in many areas, and 
minerals only occur in set locations, which often coincide with threatened biodiversity. 
In these instances, mitigation banking seems like the only option in trying to conserve 
the biodiversity, short of banning mining in vast areas of the country. It is therefore 
imperative that this tool be introduced and utilised widely, and that the system be 
properly managed and monitored. 
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The introduction of environmental tax is important in and of itself, in order to achieve 
specified environmental objectives, but is also necessary in one model of funding the 
environmental fund. It is therefore important that the framework for environmental 
tax which is already in place be expanded, and that the design of this tool be integrated 
into the other MBIs which should be introduced in the future. 
 
Finally, the main MBI currently in use – the performance bond – can be improved 
dramatically through the implementation of lessons learnt from the US and Canada. 
The determination of quantum by the state rather than the applicant, the holding of 
the funds by the state (rather than the placement of such revenue in private trust 
funds), and the increased oversight, are all elements which would strengthen the 
current situation in South Africa and would lead to a more effective tool. Several 
weaknesses are addressed above, including concerns around vulnerability to the 
insolvency of mines, the lack of updated formulas to determine quantum, and the 
failure to properly account for the cost of rehabilitation. These issues need to be 
addressed urgently by the legislature, in light of the importance of this MBI, and buy-in 
must be achieved from the mining industry itself. 
 
In summary, South Africa’s mining legacy would appear to be a superfund sized 
problem rather than a trust fund baby. However, several possibilities exist for 
improving the situation through the introduction of an environmental fund, in 
conjunction with other MBIs, and the potential exists to solve many of the weaknesses 
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